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Protecting Third Parties in Contracts
Kishanthi Parella*
Corporations routinely impose externalities on a broad range of non-shareholders, as
illustrated by several unsuccessful lawsuits against corporations involving forced labor,
human trafficking, child labor, and environmental harms in global supply chains. Lack
of legal accountability subsequently translates into low legal risk for corporate misconduct, which reduces the likelihood of prevention. Corporate misconduct toward nonshareholders arises from a fundamental inconsistency within contract law regarding the
status of third parties: On the one hand, we know that it takes a community to contract.
Contracting parties often rely on multiple third parties—not signatories to the
contract—to play important roles in facilitating exchange, such as reducing market
transaction costs, improving information flows, and decreasing the risk of opportunism.
On the other hand, we deny this community protection from the externalities that contracting parties impose on them. This article examines a corporation’s duties to others in
its role as a contracting party. Normatively, this article proposes an alternative view of
contracts as an ecosystem with three attendant principles that result from this view:
(a) third-party protections from negative externalities, (b) contract design obligations of
contracting parties, and (c) recourse to legal remedies for third parties. On a policy level,
this article proposes the following duty to contract in order to translate theory into practice: Contracting parties are required to take into account negative externalities to third
parties when the contracting parties could reasonably foresee that performance of the
contract would create a risk of physical harm to these third parties.
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INTRODUCTION
At the core of contract law lies a fundamental inconsistency: On the one
hand, we have long known that it takes a community to contract. A contract is an ecosystem, involving the signatories to the formal contract but
also sustained and nourished by a rich array of institutions maintained
by third parties—parties who are not signatories to the contract.1 Kinship
networks, trade associations, and community organizations reduce market transaction costs associated with exchanges by creating social preferences for pro-contractual behavior,2 improving information flows,3
decreasing the risk of opportunism,4 screening potential exchange partners through codes of ethics,5 and reducing opportunism by increasing
and redistributing the losses that a party may suffer from cheating.6
These are many of the ways that third parties help contract signatories

1

See, e.g., Katherine Pistor, Yoram Keinan & Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Evolution of Corporate
Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries, 18 THE WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER
89, 92 (2003); Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External,
78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 344 (1983) (“[I]t is important to stress the highly relational character
of all contracts in real life. Exchange of any importance is impossible outside a society.”);
Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and
Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1386, 1402–04
(2010); Cathy Hwang, Faux Contracts, 105 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2019). For a discussion of
systems approaches to corporate law, see Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions:
The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 583 (2018).
2

Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641,
1667 (2003); Linda D. Molm, Gretchen Peterson & Nobuyuki Takahashi, In the Eye of the
Beholder: Procedural Justice in Social Exchange, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 128, 150 (2003).

3
Lisa Bernstein, Contract Governance in Small-World Networks: The Case of the Maghribi Traders,
113 NW. U. L. REV. 1009, 1022–23 (2019); Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic
Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525, 526 (1991).
4

Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1782 (2001); Barak D. Richman, How
Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York,
31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 383, 384 (2006).

5

See generally Robert C. Ellickson, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991) (describing several social norms that provide order in property disputes); Janet
T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative
to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 352 (1981).
6

See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 1022–23; Greif, supra note 3, at 526.
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by enabling exchanges—even those that might not otherwise occur but
for the contract ecosystems that third parties provide.
As such, third parties are not outsiders in exchanges but very much
integral to the exercise. When we exclusively focus on the most obvious
part of the exchange—whether it be the paper contract, a handshake, or
someone’s word—we risk missing all of the other actors and their roles
in the exchange. The piece of paper, the handshake, and the promise
are just the tip of the iceberg in the ecosystem of exchange.7
Unfortunately, third parties remain hidden parties in exchanges. They are
not hidden because they disguise themselves, but because we choose not to see
them. And this oversight has real consequences in our legal system. Contracts
do not endanger signatories only; they also pose risk of harm to third parties
through a variety of externalities.8 These externalities are particularly evident in
global supply chain contracts that govern the “full range of activities that firms,
farmers and workers carry out to bring a product or service from its conception
to its end use, recycling or reuse.”9 In the supply chain context, a variety of
externalities arise implicating environmental, labor, and human rights harms.
This article focuses on the latter type of harm because human rights
abuses in supply chains are an increasingly important policy issue,
nationally and internationally. In July 2020 alone, a new Senate bill was
introduced10 that addresses human rights in supply chains, as well as
new executive advisories and sanctions concerning supply chains in
China that may involve the use of forced labor.11 On July 1, 2020, the
United States Department of State, along with the U.S. Department of the

7

See Belinfanti & Stout, supra note 1, at 600 (describing how the elements of a public company, such
as human, financial, and physical capital, “are interconnected, influencing each other in ways that
allow them to operate as a unified whole, separate and apart from their individual selves”).
8

See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. REG. 211, 212 (2015); David
A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 199 (2019);
Andrew Johnston, Governing Externalities: The Potential of Reflexive Corporate Social Responsibility 1 (Univ. of Cambridge Ctr. for Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 436, 2012) [hereinafter Johnston, Governing Externalities]; Cathy Hwang & David Hoffman, The Social Cost of
Contract, COLUMBIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 6); Andrew Johnston, Facing
Up to Social Cost: The Real Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV.
221, 222 (2011) [hereinafter Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost].

9

Stefano Ponte, Gary Gereffi & Gale Raj-Reichert, HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 1 (2019).

10

Slave-Free Business Certification Act of 2020, S. 4241, 116th Cong. (2020).

11

See infra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
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Treasury, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, issued a business advisory to companies with this warning:
Businesses with potential exposure in their supply chain to the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) or to facilities outside Xinjiang that
use labor or goods from Xinjiang should be aware of the reputational, economic, and legal risks of involvement with entities that engage in human
rights abuses, including but not limited to forced labor in the manufacture of
goods intended for domestic and international distribution.12

The advisory recommended that, in order to manage these risks, “businesses
should apply industry human rights due diligence policies and procedures to address
risks.”13 This advisory highlighted how supply chain exposure could arise
through “relying on labor or goods sourced in Xinjiang, or from factories elsewhere in China implicated in the forced labor of individuals from Xinjiang in
their supply chains[.]”14 This warning is particularly relevant for many American
and foreign companies that may have supply chain contacts in Xinjiang.15
On July 20, 2020, the Department of Commerce followed up on the
advisory by adding eleven Chinese companies to the Entity List because
they are “implicated in human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) campaign of repression, mass arbitrary detention, forced labor, involuntary collection of
biometric data, and genetic analyses targeted at Muslim minority groups
from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).”16
These actions will hopefully incentivize those companies with supply
chains in China to consider human rights risks. But what about the companies that do not maintain supply chains in China? What incentives are
present to encourage them to examine their own supply chains? After
12

U.S. DEPT’T OF STATE, RISK AND CONSIDERATION FOR BUSINESSES WITH SUPPLY CHAIN EXPOSURE TO ENTIENGAGED IN FORCED LABOR AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN XINJIANG (2020), https://www.
dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/20_0701_xinjiang-supply-chain-business-advisory.pdf.
TIES

13

Id. at 1 (emphasis added).

14

Id. at 3.

15

Dan Strumpf & Liza Lin, Blacklisting of Chinese Firms Rattles American Supply Chains, WALL
STREET J., July 21, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/blacklisting-of-chinese-firms-rattlesamerican-supply-chains-11595343494.
16

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Commerce Department Adds Eleven Chinese
Entities Implicated in Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang to the Entity List (July 20, 2020),
https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/07/commerce-department-addseleven-chinese-entities-implicated-human.
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all, the risks of forced labor and other human rights violations are not
unique to supply chains in China but also characterize supply chains all
over the world.17 This article develops a framework for understanding
the origins of human rights risks and recommends additional policy
options to encourage other companies similarly to adopt human rights
due diligence practices or to invest in other prevention strategies.
This article begins by exploring the problem of why human rights abuses
arise in supply chains. Certainly, political and economic conditions in different
countries cause or contribute to these human rights violations; however, these
public dimensions to human rights abuses in supply chains—focusing on government acts—are beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article focuses
on the lesser-known side to human rights violations that arise because of
externalities created by private parties when they contract with each other.
This article explains that third parties—such as consumers, employees
of suppliers, and local communities, for example—are at risk from two
different types of externalities. Type I externalities are harms that result
from contract performance when contracting parties perform as
expected; contract terms concerning price, volume, and delivery times
can exacerbate risk of third-party harms, such as forced labor and
human trafficking, because these risks are inherent in the contract as
designed.18 In order to address these risks, multinational companies usually enter into a second set of contracts—codes of conduct—with their
overseas suppliers. But suppliers often violate these codes, resulting in
Type II externalities that result from contractual breach. Unfortunately,
despite these risks, third parties are unable to address either externality
because they do not participate in contract design (Type I externality)
and cannot assert rights under supply contracts (Type II externality).
Recent litigation provides ample illustrations of the severity of third-party
externalities that these supply contracts produce and the inability of third
parties to address them. For example, in December 2019, an international
advocacy group filed a lawsuit in federal district court on behalf of a group of

17

See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT (2020), https://www.state.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf.

18

See, e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND BUSINESS 2017: PROMOTING RESPONSIBILITY AND ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY,
2016-17, HL 153, at 13 (UK); NIKOLAUS HAMMER & REKA PLUGOR, A NEW INDUSTRY ON A
SKEWED PLAYING FIELD, SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN UK GARMENT
MANUFACTURING 42 (2015) (discussing supply chain practices in Fast Fashion industry that
lead to human rights risks in the UK garment industry).
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children against a number of tech giants—Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Dell,
and Tesla—for “knowingly benefiting from and aiding and abetting the cruel
and brutal use of young children in Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) to
mine cobalt, a key component of every rechargeable lithium-ion battery used in
the electronic devices these companies manufacture.”19 Plaintiffs allege that
“young children mining Defendants’ cobalt are not merely being forced to
work full-time, extremely dangerous mining jobs at the expense their educations and futures; they are being regularly maimed and killed by tunnel collapses and other known hazards common to cobalt mining in the DRC.”20
This lawsuit is one of several concerning externalities produced by supply
chain contracts. Litigation involving different human rights abuses (child
labor, forced labor, human trafficking, and extrajudicial killing, among
others) by different corporations (Mars, Costco, Wal-Mart, and Royal Dutch
Petroleum, among others) in different countries (Thailand, Nigeria, the Ivory
Coast, and Bangladesh, among others) has been brought by a variety of corporate stakeholders (laborers, consumers, and local communities) before
both federal and state courts alleging causes of action based in international
law, consumer protection laws, contract law, and tort law.21 However, almost
all of these cases share a common fate: dismissal.22 The outcomes in these
cases result from a lack of judicial recognition of duties that contracting
parties owe to various third parties: no duty to monitor supply chains, no
duty of care to laborers in supply chains, and no duty to disclose information
to consumers about child labor or forced labor in supply chains.23

19

Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 1, Doe v. Apple, Inc.,
No. 1:19-cv-03737 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2019).

20

Id. at 1–2.

21
See, e.g., Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2009) (alleging violations of
codes of conduct contained in the supply contracts); Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., CA. No.
N15C-07-0174, 2016 WL 2616375, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016) (alleging negligence and
wrongful death claims arising from the collapse of Rana Plaza in Bangladesh in 2013); Doe v. Nestle,
S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 2018) (alleging claims for aiding and abetting slave labor).
22
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 572 F.3d at 685 (affirming the motion to dismiss); Rahaman, 2016
WL 2616375, at *10 (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss).
23
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 572 F.3d at 685 (“[W]e conclude that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim
against Wal-Mart…. Wal-Mart had no legal duty under the Standards or common law negligence
principles to monitor its suppliers or to protect Plaintiffs from the suppliers’ alleged substandard labor
practices. Wal-Mart is not Plaintiffs’ employer, and the relationship between Wal-Mart …. and Plaintiffs is too attenuated to support restitution under an unjust enrichment theory.”) (internal citations
and footnotes omitted); Rahaman, 2016 WL 2616375, at *10 (“Just as in Doe I v. Wal-Mart, Plaintiffs
in this case have failed to allege facts to establish that Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.”).
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The juxtaposition of third-party contributions with third-party
harms sheds light on how we still imagine contracts in the twentyfirst century. Namely, despite the multilateral nature of contracting—
in which multiple third parties nourish contract exchanges—many
courts still adhere to a bilateral model of contracting in which a
contract is imagined as an agreement between two or more
parties that is both isolated and insulated from the broader society. 24
This view perpetuates the notion that those most at risk of harm
in contracts are counterparties; it also influences our diagnoses
of the types of harms that may result from a contract, such as
opportunism, which, once again, are harms that most threaten
counterparties.25
We can come up with a variety of reasons for why we should revise
this view and account for third-party interests in contracts. Some are
moral: it’s the right thing to do. Others are economic: doing so provides long-term value for the company. Some situations foster compliance considerations: the law commands it. Others foster strategic
ones: it’s good for brand value and marketing. But the reason that this
article highlights originates from the concept of contract itself and the
fundamental tension within it. While we may continue to view contracts as bilateral arrangements when it comes to assessing harms, we
have known for a long time that contracts are multilateral when it
comes to the benefits third parties confer on contracting ones. Contracts do not occur in a vacuum. We rely on institutions and organizations developed by a variety of third parties to support those
contracting relationships even while contract signatories continue to
impose a variety of externalities on those same parties. We need to
close the loop.26

24

See Bagchi, supra note 8, at 219 (“For different reasons, scholars from both philosophical
and economic perspectives are drawn to an insular picture of contract interpretation
focused exclusively on the parties to contract. The result is that, although everyone would
acknowledge the legitimate interests of third parties, courts do not assign any formal and
systematic role to those interests in the exercise of interpretation.”).

25

But see Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1433 (2004).

26

See Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 8, at 199–201 (discussing the ways that contract
parties externalize costs to third parties while enjoying the benefits).
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Currently, the incentive structure for CEOs and corporate directors
does not encourage these corporate leaders to consider the interests of
third parties in their decision making.27 Instead, “[t]hey can be expected
to protect other stakeholders only to the extent that doing so would not
hurt share value.”28 Many corporate law scholars seek to address this
gap by arguing that fiduciary duties should incentivize corporate regard
for employees, local communities, and other stakeholders.29 Other
scholars have turned to negligence theories and advocated for the judicial recognition of a common law duty of care of businesses to respect human rights

27
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance,
CORNELL L. REV., (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3544978 (noting that director and CEO compensation practices are
designed to align the interests of these actors with shareholders, not stakeholders).

Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, ‘Stakeholder’ Capitalism Seems Mostly for Show, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 6, 2020) https://www.wsj.com/articles/stakeholder-capitalism-seems-mostlyfor-show-11596755220.
28

29

See Leo E. Strine Jr., Kirby M. Smith & Reilly S. Steel, Caremark and ESG, Perfect
Together: A Practical Approach to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark
and EESG Strategy, IOWA LAW REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1) (arguing that
“EESG is best understood as an extension of the board’s duty to implement and monitor
a compliance program under Caremark”); Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary
Relationship, 105 GEO. L. J. 819, 821 (2017) (arguing that employers owe fiduciary and
quasi-fiduciary duties to employees); Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N. C.
L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1991) (proposing a “stakeholder model of corporate social responsibility” which “expands directorial fiduciary duties to encompass actions that shield
workers from disruptions brought about by plant closings and other corporate changes.
Such fiduciary duties toward workers would require directors to provide adequate severance payments, job retraining, and other appropriate relief to displaced workers.”);
Kent Greenfield, The Third Way, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2014) (arguing that it
would be a violation of fiduciary duties “to prioritize one stakeholder over others consistently and persistently or to fail to consider the interests of all stakeholders in significant
corporate decisions”); Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost, supra note 8, at 236 (arguing
that the directors’ duty of good faith “should be reformed to require the directors to
take action that is capable of producing returns for the shareholders while internalizing
the externalities of which they become aware in the course of management.”); Stavros
Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law and Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1459
(2020) (arguing that “that courts should recognize ESG as an essential part of boards’
monitoring mission”); Veronica Root Martinez, More Meaningful Ethics 1 (U. Chi. L. R.
Online, Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 191023), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3474344 (advocating for the development of company policies
that “(i) protect the dignity of, (ii) promote the flourishing of, and (iii) advance the interests of various stakeholders of firms within firms as a baseline to be used for establishing
the ethics components of their ethics and compliance programs.”).
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and other environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns.30 This article
shares this same objective but takes a different path by examining a corporation’s duties to others in its role as a contracting party. Contracts are the primary means through which corporations interact in the world. By reimagining
contracts we also reimagine corporations and their duties to others.31

30

Douglass Cassel, Outlining the Case for a Common Law Duty of Care of Business to Exercise Human
Rights Due Diligence, 1 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 179, 181 (2016) (advocating for a business common
law duty of care that includes human rights due diligence); Jaakko Salminen, From Product Liability to Production Liability: Modelling a Response to the Liability Deficit of Global Value Chains on Historical
Transformations of Production, 23 COMPETITION & CHANGE 420, 422 (2019) (proposing production
liability that involves “a lead firm’s liability for the inadequate governance of its value chain
towards labour, environmental and other interests”); Dalia Palombo, The Duty of Care of the Parent
Company: A Comparison between French Law, UK Precedents and the Swiss Proposals, 4 BUS. & HUM.
RTS. J. 265, 266 (2019) (discussing French, Swiss, and UK proposed and enacted liability regimes
in which “extraterritorial liability is based on a duty of care and a due diligence obligation that
parent companies owe in respect to the torts committed by their affiliates”); see also Steven
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 449
(2001) (proposing a corporate responsibility for human rights protection under which “business
enterprises will have duties both insofar as they cooperate with those actors whom international
law already sees as the prime sources of abuses—states—and insofar as their activities infringe
upon the human dignity of those with whom they have special ties”); Jennifer M. Green, Corporate Torts: International Human Rights and Superior Officers,17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 447, 452 (2016) (evaluating possibilities for holding individual corporate officers liable for human rights violations
under a theory of superior responsibility); Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent
Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1769, 1796–99 (considering various theories of liability for parent companies).
31

See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1148 (1932); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA.
L. REV. 247 (1999); Tamara C. Belinfanti, Forget Roger Rabbit—Is Corporate Purpose Being Framed?,
58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675, 678 (2014); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 45–47 (1991); Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between Responsibility and
Accountability, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 237, 238 (2015); Lyman Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 964–66 (2002); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, ‘Special,’
Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us about the Corporation–and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 453, 487–95 (2016); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201, 240–51
(1990); Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Social Responsibility, ESG, and Compliance, CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
COMPLIANCE (D. Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij eds., forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3479723; see also Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L J. 923, 929 (2019)
(proposing a “Sustainability Discussion and Analysis” that would “require an issuer to disclose, at a
minimum, the three sustainability issues that are most significant for the firm’s operations, to explain
the basis for that selection, and to explain the impact of those issues on firm performance”); Virginia
Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L.
647, 653 (2016) (explaining the economic rationales for risk-related activism); Ann Lipton, Not Everything Is about Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, YALE J. REG. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3435578 (recommending a disclosure system that produces information for non-shareholder audiences), https://bit.ly/2NzJd6o.
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In order to protect third parties, we need to recognize contract obligations that flow to those beyond contract signatories. This article suggests
a number of legislative and judicial reforms that can help to protect third
parties in contracts. In the supply chain context, academics and legislators have proposed due diligence requirements that would force corporate actors to consider the human rights impacts of their conduct on a
variety of third parties and to take steps to address and mitigate them.
For example, in October 2019, the French Corporate Duty of Vigilance
Law32 was the basis of a suit against Total, the multinational energy
giant.33 This law “requires companies to create and implement publiclyavailable vigilance plans for which they can be held accountable”34 and is
“designed to improve the corporate social responsibility programs of the
companies in scope, as well as aid the victims of these crimes in achieving
justice.”35 Using this law, six environmental groups sued Total for its
planned oil operations in a national park in Uganda that they allege
would create substantial human rights and environmental risks—risks
inadequately addressed by Total in its vigilance plans under the law.36
However, many legislators around the world remain reluctant to go that
route. By highlighting contract’s fundamental inconsistency, this article
offers another justification to support mandatory due diligence
requirements.
But this article goes even further by proposing a new duty that borrows elements from both contract and tort law. Under this duty,
32

Loi 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des
entreprises donneuses d’ordre [Law 2017-399 of March 27, 2017 Relating to the Duty of
Care of Parent Companies and Contractors], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 28, 2017 (Fr.), https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000034290626&categorieLien=id [hereinafter French
Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law].
33

Total Sued Under France’s New Duty of Vigilance Law, ENV ’T NEWS SERV. (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://ens-newswire.com/2019/10/23/total-sued-under-frances-new-duty-of-vigilance-law/.

34

Regulatory Resource Center: What Is the French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law?, ASSENT,
https://www.assentcompliance.com/assentu/resources/article/french-corporate-duty-ofvigilance-law/?PF_Corporate_Social_Responsibility__c=true.

35

Id.

Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves
All Americans’, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/
business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-thatserves-all-americans.
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contracting parties must take into account negative externalities to third parties
when the contracting parties could reasonably foresee that performance of the contract would create a risk of physical harm to these third parties. The standard of
care is satisfied by reasonable contract design. Many of the lawsuits alleging third-party externalities sound in either contract law or negligence
law independently.37 However, each falls short because of the status of
third parties in these supply chains. Under contract law, third parties in
supply chains are not beneficiaries of promises exchanged in supply
chain codes of conduct. Under negligence law, corporations do not owe a
general duty of care to employees of their suppliers. The proposed duty
addresses the gap between these two areas of law by providing incentives
for contracting parties to account for third-party externalities while providing the parties with significant latitude in addressing those externalities. As such, it preserves the traditional features of contract law, such as
flexibility and autonomy, but curtails the freedom of contract by situating
it against the background of negligence law.38 While some scholars have
advocated for the protection of third-party interests through third-party
liability,39 contract interpretation,40 or public policy,41 this article argues
that some externalities are grave enough to warrant obligations at the ex
ante contract design stage.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I traces the roots of corporate
misconduct in the supply chain to contract design and the distinction
between Type I and Type II externalities, including examining the reasons why these externalities arise and remain inadequately addressed. It
also provides an overview of recent litigation concerning harms to third
parties in supply chains. Part II proposes a duty to contract that requires
37

See, e.g., Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., CA. No. N15C-07-0174,2016 WL 2616375,
at *7–8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016) (relying upon negligence principles); see also Doe
v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681–83 (9th Cir. 2009)
38

For another perspective on the relevance of negligence law to contract law, see Eric
A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1431, 1444 (2009) (considering contractual liability through the lens of fault).
39

Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1, 47–54 (2010).

40
Bagchi, supra note 8, at 242 (“When an ambiguous agreement would adversely affect the
legal interests of third parties if interpreted one way but not if interpreted another way,
courts should prefer the interpretation that generates fewer negative externalities.”).
41

Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 8, at 213.
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contracting parties to account for third-party externalities that are reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of contractual performance. It also
discusses the various advantages that this contract duty offers to the current regulatory environment, including targeting Type I externalities,
incentivizing prevention, addressing weaknesses of market mechanisms
and transparency laws, and offering a judicial basis for human rights due
diligence. Part III provides a normative basis supporting this contractual
duty for supply chain contracts and beyond. It begins by providing an
overview of the role that third parties undertake in contracts by briefly
reviewing the institutional research on private ordering that highlights the
various institutions that third parties build and maintain. An explanation of
functional advantages that these institutions offer to contracting parties,
such as reducing the transaction costs associated with search and information gathering, negotiating and drafting complete contracts, or providing
for legal enforcement is also provided. It concludes by articulating a view of
contracts as ecosystems with particular normative principles that result from
this view: (a) third-party protections from negative externalities, (b) contract
design obligations of contracting parties, and (c) recourse to legal remedies
for third parties.

I. THE CONTRACTUAL ROOTS OF CORPORATE
MISCONDUCT
Many of the harms that corporations impose on society arise from the
contracts that they design, negotiate, and perform. While contracts primarily benefit the contract’s signatories, they can create a risk of harms
to a variety of actors who are not formally part of the contract. Part I.A
explains that Type I externalities are harms that result from contract performance when contracting parties perform as expected; in contrast, Type
II externalities result from contractual breach. Part I.B explains that while
various parties suffer these risks, they are powerless to do much about
it. As nonsignatories to the contracts, they have no role at the bargaining
table when the contract is designed and negotiated and no remedy from
the courts when the contract results in injury to them. Part I.C explains
the types of third-party harms that can result from both types of externalities, including harms to laborers, consumers, and communities.
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A. Externalities in the Supply Chain: Type I (Contractual Performance) versus
Type II (Contractual Breach)
International economic production is organized through a vast array of supply chains that connect individuals and companies in various countries to
each other.42 Each of these supply chains is created and maintained by a
variety of supply contracts. Supply contracts can vary in length, objective,
terms, parties, duration, and so forth. For the purpose of the following discussion, this section focuses on two features of the supply contract: the master agreement and supply contract (“master agreement”) and supplier code
of conduct (“code”). Each of these contracts creates the risk of negative
externalities for noncontracting parties, or third parties.
What is an externality? Quite simply, it is a cost that one or more
parties does not bear.43 Another feature of negative externalities is that
those creating them are usually not inclined to account for them in their
decision making because the costs are borne by others and not themselves; “corporations that produce externalities gain all the benefits of
their economic activity, but do not bear all the costs.”44 The result is that
“[s]ince corporations take no account of these costs, their private costs of
engaging in the productive activity are lower than the social costs, and so
there will be more production than is optimal from the perspective of
society as a whole.”45
A contract creates third-party externalities in two different ways:
Performance results in a Type I externality, while breach results in a Type
42

See, e.g., GARY GEREFFI & KARINA FERNANDEZ-STARK, GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS: A PRIMER
7 (2d ed. 2016) (“The value chain describes the full range of activities that firms and
workers perform to bring a product from its conception to end use and beyond. This
includes activities such as research and development (R&D), design, production, marketing,
distribution and support to the final consumer. The activities that comprise a value chain
can be contained within a single firm or divided among different firms.”).
43

Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 137
(2014). For the purpose of this article, I use the term “externalities” to refer exclusively to
negative externalities or costs imposed on third parties, as distinct from positive externalities that are benefits conferred on third parties. Id; see also Johnston, Governing Externalities,
supra note 8, at 1 (“A negative externality occurs where a decision is taken that results in an
event which has adverse, uncompensated effects on another party who does not consent
to it.”)

44

Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost, supra note 8, at 221; see also Grow Sun & Daniels, supra
note 43, at 137.

45

Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost, supra note 8, at 221–22.
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II externality. Type I externalities do not occur when things go wrong
but when parties perform exactly as expected under the supply agreements.46 Specifically, the very terms of the supply contract create the risk
of externalities for third parties; performance of these contractual terms
is often the root cause of the externalities that third parties encounter.47
Terms such as purchase price, delivery schedule, and volume of orders
may place a heavy burden on suppliers to perform.48 In certain industries, suppliers may be reluctant to push back against buyers regarding
these terms because of fear of losing the buyer’s business.49 For example,
if a supplier does not have an exclusive supply relationship with a buyer,
it is under pressure to agree to the buyer’s demands regarding pricing
and delivery because there may be multiple other suppliers to whom the
buyer may turn if the supplier cannot comply.50 Additionally, if these
supply contracts are short-term, then the supplier is constantly under
pressure to acquiesce to the buyer so that it may continue to obtain the
buyer’s business in the future.51
These conditions increase the risk of practices in the supply chain that
result in harmful externalities to third parties. For example, a short
delivery window and high volume may increase the likelihood of

46

In this discussion, I keep separate the terms of the Master Agreement and Codes of Conduct to identify the unique risks of externalities that each creates.

47

See, e.g., JUSTINE NOLAN & MARTIJN BOERSMA, ADDRESSING MODERN SLAVERY 41–42 (2019)
(discussing the labor implications for production that relies on just-in-time production and
lean manufacturing).

Id. at 41–42, 54; Stephanie Barrientos, Contract Labour: The ‘Achilles Heel’ of Corporate Codes in
Commercial Value Chains, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 977, 980–82 (2008); Pun Ngai & Jenny Chan, Global
Capital, the State, and Chinese Workers: The Foxconn Experience, 38 MODERN CHINA 383, 385–86 (2012).

48

49

See NOLAN & BOERSMA, supra note 47, at 158 (referencing a study by the International
Labor Organization that “reported that 39% of suppliers surveyed accepted orders ‘whose
price did not allow them to cover production costs.’”).
50

Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: The Global Footwear Industry’s Evolving
Governance Structure, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 143, 144 (2008); Richard M. Locke, Ben A. Rissing &
Timea Pal, Complements or Substitutes? Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of
Labour Standards in Global Supply Chains, 51 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 519, 526 (2012); Bin
Jiang, Implementing Supplier Codes of Conduct in Global Supply Chains: Process Explanations from
Theoretic and Empirical Perspectives, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 77, 80 (2009).
51

Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly Cares about Global Supply Chains,
48 J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 24, 25 (2012) (describing modular, relational, and captive governance strategies in global supply chains).
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subcontracting from the supplier to another party.52 Subcontracting relationships are fraught with risks because (a) subcontractors may not be
bound to the buyer’s standards and policies, (b) buyer may be unaware
of the identity of the subcontractor and its production sites and so cannot
send its representatives to monitor or audit those facilities, and
(c) subcontractors may not be approved by buyers and are selected by
suppliers only because the subcontractor can meet production demands
and not for social compliance quality reasons.53 It is therefore unsurprising that many incidents of publicized wrongdoing in supply chains occur
at subcontracting sites. It is the performance of the contract that creates
Type I externalities and leads to many of the lawsuits.54
Given that the terms of supply contracts may create Type I externalities for third parties, many supply contracts include a supplier code of
conduct, as reflected in this hypothetical supply contract code of conduct
for the fictional company ACME:
Social Compliance. Supplier agrees to comply with and be bound by, and to
cause all of its sub-suppliers and other subcontractors to comply with and be
bound by, the ACME Workplace Code of Conduct and all other requirements and obligations set forth in Schedule [X] attached hereto, as it may be
amended from time to time by ACME (collectively, the “Social Compliance
Requirements”).

An accompanying schedule (“Schedule [X]”) to the contract may add further obligations of suppliers, such as ensuring that (a) sub-suppliers and
other subcontractors also comply with the code, and (b) suppliers agree to
provide ACME and its representatives with audit and assessment rights of
supplier facilities to ensure compliance with the code of conduct.
These codes of conduct appear to address Type I externalities to third
parties through a variety of contract terms. First, the risks associated with
subcontracting are addressed by putting ACME’s suppliers “on the hook”
52

UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER & CENTRE FOR SUSTAINABLE WORK AND EMPLOYMENT FUTURES, NEW
INDUSTRY ON A SKEWED PLAYING FIELD: SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONS AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN
UK GARMENT MANUFACTURING, CENTRE FOR SUSTAINABLE WORK AND EMPLOYMENT FUTURES,
22–25 (2015).
53

Locke, supra note 50, at 526; Michael E. Blowfield & Catherine S. Dolan, Stewards of
Virtue? The Ethical Dilemma of CSR in African Agriculture, 39 DEV. & CHANGE 1, 6–7 (2008);
Sarah Dadush, Contracting for Human Rights: Looking to Version 2.0 of the ABA Model Clauses,
68 AM. U. L. REV. 1519, 1525, 1540–41 (2019).

54

See infra Part 2.3
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for the actions of their subcontractors; the code states that the latter are
also bound to their terms and policies and that noncompliance by the latter may have negative consequences for ACME’s suppliers. In this way,
the code incentivizes suppliers to choose their subcontractors with compliance considerations in mind and to take action to support subcontractors’ compliance with the code’s terms. The code also provides ACME
(and its representatives) with audit rights, including the right to interview workers and inspect documents to assess compliance with the code.
Why would multinational buyers include such provisions in their supply agreements? One driver is reputational risk: misconduct by suppliers
or sub-suppliers may expose the buyer to unwelcome media attention,
consumer boycotts, shareholder activism, and even lawsuits. Therefore,
buyers may want to reduce the risk of labor abuses, such as child labor
and forced labor, by including contractual terms that obligate their suppliers to abide by standards and policies covering social compliance. A
second driver may be the availability of model clauses addressing social
compliance risks, such as those recently drafted by the Working Group
to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts
(Working Group) of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association.55 Finally, companies may want to include these clauses as a
means to manage a variety of compliance concerns, such as compliance
with national laws addressing disclosures and human rights in supply
chains.56 The problem, of course, is that suppliers may not always comply with these terms; when they breach them, they create Type II externalities that lead to many of the lawsuits discussed in Part 2.3.
B. Managing Externalities: Contract Limitations of Third Parties
Despite the externalities that they encounter, third parties are unable to
manage these risks as are contracting parties. Contracting parties are
55

David V. Snyder & Susan A. Maslow, Human Rights Protections in International Supply
Chains—Protecting Workers and Managing Company Risk: 2018 Report and Model Contract
Clauses from the Working Group to Draft Human Rights Protections in International Supply Contracts, ABA Section of Business Law, 73 BUS. LAW. 1093, 1096-1103 (2018) (setting forth proposed clauses); Jonathan C. Lipson, Promising Justice: Contract (As) Social Responsibility, 2019
WISCONSIN L. REV. 1109, 1117 (2019) (“Unlike the conventional bilateral contract, KSR
terms deliberately contemplate the welfare of persons not parties to the contract, or conditions such as environmental sustainability, that are directed at society in general.”).
56

Snyder & Maslow, supra note 55, at 1096; Lipson, supra note 55, at 17–23.
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Table 1: Challenges with Addressing Third-Party Externalities in Supply
Chains
Type

Issue

Risk Management

Third-Party Limitation

I

Performance

Contract design

II

Breach

Judicial remedy

No role
ex ante
No rights ex post

provided two opportunities to address risks to themselves: ex ante contract design and ex post legal liability. As discussed below, and reflected in
Table 1, third parties are not afforded either opportunity.
When contracting parties encounter potential risks from the agreement, they minimize these risks to themselves through contract
design.57 The contract agreement also creates risks for third parties,
but, unlike contracting parties, they are not in a position to participate
in contract design. Third parties, such as laborers, consumers, and
local communities, do not have a seat at the bargaining table when the
buyers and suppliers negotiate and execute supply agreements.
Therefore, they cannot directly influence the drafting of contract
terms that may minimize risks to themselves. And the contracting
parties at the negotiating table may have little incentive to consider
third-party interests when negotiating the contract unless they are
obligated to do so because of mandatory law, private governance
arrangements, or fear of reputational risks.58 As a result, third parties
often find themselves in the unfortunate situation that they may suffer
Type I externalities but may have limited or nonexistent means to
address these risks through contract design.
Third parties are similarly limited in their ability to control Type II
externalities, which result from a breach of a code of conduct. Third
parties are not signatories to these codes of conduct so are not in a position to sue multinational buyers for a breach of contract. The inability to
impose ex post legal sanctions in the future means that buyers may have
little incentive to consider the welfare of third parties in the present.

57

See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Keynote Address: Modern Supply Chains and Outmoded Contract Law,
68 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1511 (2019).

58

Lipson, supra note 55, at 17–23.
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C. Consequences of Third-Party Externalities
The risks of Type I and Type II externalities, and the inability to control
them through contract design or legal enforcement, lead to a variety of
harms to third parties. This part provides illustrative examples of the
variety of harms that corporations can cause to different individuals
around the world through their supply contracts, and how the legal system is complicit in these harms by failing to recognize these legal claims
and denying the victims remedies.
1. Laborers
Some of the most painful externalities of supply chain contracts fall upon
the laborers at the overseas production sites for goods that are produced
for American companies. While supply contracts govern obligations
between the retailer, for example, and the supplier, the terms of those
contracts—such as tight price competition, high volume, and quick turnaround times—can create significant externalities for the men and
women who work for those suppliers.59
In Doe v. Wal-Mart,60 employees of Wal-Mart’s foreign suppliers in
countries including China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Swaziland, and
Nicaragua brought a lawsuit against Wal-Mart regarding the working
conditions at those suppliers’ sites.61 Critically, they pointed out that WalMart included a supplier code of conduct (“Standards for Suppliers”) in
each of its contracts with its suppliers.62 The code “require[s] foreign
suppliers to adhere to local laws and local industry standards regarding
working conditions like pay, hours, forced labor, child labor, and

59

See, e.g., VERITÉ, STRENGTHENING PROTECTIONS AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN FEDERAL
CORPORATE SUPPLY CHAINS 8–9 (2015) (“Industries that are characterized by sharp seasonal or product life-cycle fluctuations in labor demand are also at risk …. The need for a
large number of workers for short periods of time leads many employers to turn to labor
brokers for assistance with recruitment …. In addition, employers in industries with sharp
spikes in labor demand sometimes seek to intensify production by temporarily increasing
pressure on their existing workforce through the use of compulsory overtime or other
forced labor practices.”).
AND

60

Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).

61

Id. at 683.

62

Id.
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discrimination.”63 The code also provided Wal-Mart with important
inspection rights regarding the enforcement of the code.64 The plaintiffs
blamed Wal-Mart for not exercising the inspection rights that it possessed by virtue of its contracts with its foreign suppliers.65 Specifically,
they alleged that “Wal-Mart does not adequately monitor its suppliers”66
and that “in 2004, only eight % of audits were unannounced, and that
workers are [ ] often coached on how to respond to auditors.”67 Plaintiffs
also alleged that “the short deadlines and low prices in Wal-Mart’s supply
contracts forced suppliers to violate the Standards in order to satisfy the
terms of the contracts.”68
Plaintiffs claimed that they were third-party beneficiaries of the promises exchanged between Wal-Mart and its suppliers regarding the code
and that Wal-Mart promised the suppliers that “it would monitor the
suppliers’ compliance with the Standards, and that Plaintiffs are thirdparty beneficiaries of that promise to monitor.”69 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not agree, finding the code
provided Wal-Mart with rights but not duties to exercise those rights:
“Because, as we view the supply contracts, Wal-Mart made no promise to
monitor the suppliers, no such promise flows to Plaintiffs as third-party
beneficiaries.”70 Plaintiffs also alleged a variety of other theories of liability that proved unsuccessful, including a claim for negligence.71
The Ninth Circuit is not alone in addressing the issue of harms to
laborers in supply chains. In 2016, the Delaware Superior Court
addressed the issue of whether a retailer can be liable in negligence for

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 681.

70

Id. at 681–82 (“The language and structure of the agreement show that Wal-Mart
reserved the right to inspect the suppliers, but did not adopt a duty to inspect them.”)
71

Id. at 683.
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harms suffered by employees of its suppliers. In Rahaman v. J.C. Penney,72
plaintiffs brought claims for wrongful death and negligence against
J.C. Penney, The Children’s Place, and Wal-Mart on behalf of those who
died in the collapse of Rana Plaza in 2013, which killed 1100 individuals
and injured approximately 2500 more.73 The Superior Court rejected
the negligence claim, explaining that in “negligence cases alleging nonfeasance, or omission to act, there is no general duty to others in the
absence of a ’special relationship’ between the parties.74 Plaintiffs also
attempted to establish a duty of care based on the ethical sourcing statements made by defendants. However, the court was not convinced:
“These statements by Defendants do not, by themselves, create a duty to
employees of independent contractors where a duty does not otherwise
exist.”75
2. Consumers
Consumers have brought lawsuits against large manufacturers and
retailers, claiming that conditions in the supply chain have harmed their
interests.76 For example, in National Consumers League v. J.C. Penney
72

Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., CA. No. N15C-07-0174, 2016 WL 2616375 (Del.
Super. Ct., May 4, 2016).

73

Id. at *1.

74

Id. at *8.

75

Id. at *9.

76

Legal scholars have also explored different types of harms consumers may suffer that the law
has yet to articulate as a legal injury or to address with legal remedies. See, e.g., Omri
Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, The Restoration Remedy in Private Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1901, 1903
(2018) (“Unlike pecuniary or physical harms, emotional distress is difficult to verify and measure, and the remedial tools of private law—money damages or injunctions—are often ill-suited
to redress it. Private law needs a new remedy to redress emotional harms that other areas of
law regard as protection-worthy.”); Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 868
(2018) (“[I]dentity harm can be used to expand the range of corporate practices considered to
be unfair or deceptive, and create openings for remedies that look beyond financial compensation to include reparations. Identity harm offers a conceptual container for a special type of
noneconomic injury that is currently too easy for courts to miss.”). However, as consumers,
these claims concern the emotional harms experienced by contracting parties. In contrast, this
article discusses both the economic and, often, physical injuries suffered by third parties in contract, who are in an even more vulnerable position under contract law. Despite this distinction,
the analysis provided in this article attempts to bridge this gap for both foreign and domestic
third-party victims of contractual externalities and may also prove useful to contracting parties
whose injuries the law has yet to recognize.
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et al.,77 the National Consumers League (NCL) brought claims against
J.C. Penney, The Children’s Place, and Wal-Mart for violating the District of
Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act.78 The lawsuit was based on
statements that each of the defendant retailers had posted on their websites
concerning their policies and practices regarding conduct in their supply
chains.79 Plaintiffs highlighted two features of company statements regarding
their supply chains: (a) supplier codes of conduct, and (b) auditing practices.
They claimed that these retailers promised NCL and the “general public that
their suppliers will ensure safe and healthy working conditions for their
workers and will not utilize child labor,” and that the resulting harms suffered
at Rana Plaza are evidence of a breach of those promises.80
The court, however, was unconvinced. It found that “the majority of
statements referenced by NCL are aspirational statements. The statements were not false on their face and were general in nature, outlining
the expectations of each retailer and efforts by each retailer to place
pressure on its suppliers to be more socially responsible.”81 The court
engaged in a textual analysis of the corporate statements to show how
these statements were aspirational and did not convey promises: “The
usage of the qualifying terms ‘expect’, ‘goal’, and ‘ask’ is demonstrative
of the aspirational nature of the statements and further demonstrates
that the statements are not promises to consumers, as NCL alleges in its
Amended Complaint. In these Corporate Statements, the defendants did
not use qualifying terms binding Retailers such as ‘ensure’, ‘promise’ or
‘forbid.’”82 Based on this textual analysis, the court concluded that “the
language of the defendants does not convey a promise” and that “NCL
goes too far by recasting the retailers’ aspirational statements” as such.83
77
Nat. Consumers League v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2015 CA 007731 B, 2016 WL
4080541 (D.C. Super. Ct.).

Id. at *1.

78
79

Id.

Id. at *3 (“NCL relies on the collapse to support the inference that Retailers did not properly audit their suppliers because if they had performed the auditing procedures, defendants would have known about the unsafe working conditions and the presence of child
labor.”).

80

Id. at *5.

81

Id. at *6.

82

Id. at *6.

83
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However, the court found that that the retailers’ statements regarding
their auditing practices are distinguishable because these “auditing statements are more specific and contain verifiable facts that may be material
to a consumer’s purchasing decisions.”84
In Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc.,85 plaintiff brought a lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated consumers against Mars, Inc. and Mars
Chocolate North America, LLC (collectively, “Mars”) for violations of
California’s consumer protection laws and sought restitution and injunctive relief.86 Plaintiff claimed that they would not have purchased these
chocolate products had they known about the conditions in the supply
chain or, at the least, would not have paid as much for these products.87
Plaintiff drew particular attention to the inconsistency between what
Mars professed in its corporate statements and policies and the conditions that plaintiff claimed characterized Mars’s supply chains. Specifically, its human rights policy referenced the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights and expressed Mars’s intent
to perform human rights due diligence in their cocoa supply chains.88
The complaint also referenced Mars’s supplier code of conduct that prohibits child labor, forced labor, and human trafficking and reserves the
right to audit suppliers’ facilities.89 Plaintiff argued that “although Mars
recognizes that the use of child and/or slave labor in its supply chain is
wrong and its corporate business principles and supplier code explicitly
forbid child and slave labor by its suppliers, it materially omits to disclose
to consumers at the point of purchase the likelihood that its Chocolate
Products are made from cocoa beans produced by Ivorian children
engaged in the Worst Forms of Child Labor.”90
First, the court found that there was no violation of false advertising
laws because the claims are based on omissions regarding Mars’s failure

84

Id. at *7.

85

Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2016).

86

Class Action Complaint at 23–27, Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 28, 2015) (No. 15-CV-04450)

87

Id. at ¶ 10.

88

Id. at ¶ 49.

89

Id.

90

Id. at ¶ 53, ¶ 10.
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to issue statements regarding child labor and forced labor in its supply
chains.91 Similarly, the court dismissed the claims based on unfair competition
and legal remedies acts because it found that Mars did not have a duty to disclose information regarding child labor and forced labor in its supply chain.92
3. Communities
Finally, individuals residing in the countries in which these multinational
companies operate have also brought claims alleging significant violations of their human rights. Perhaps the most famous is Chevron
v. Ecuador93 that concerns Texaco’s oil operations in previous decades,
which plaintiffs allege resulted in environmental damage and harm to
the health of those who live in the region.94 The facts of the case led to
litigation or requests for review before multiple courts and tribunals.95
In 2013, the United States Supreme Court considered a case involving
human rights abuses by multinational corporations in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum.96 The “[p]etitioners were residents of Ogoniland, an area of
250 square miles located in the Niger delta area of Nigeria.”97 The petitioners brought claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),98 which provides
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”99 Petitioners brought claims under the ATS for
violations of “the law of nations concerning aiding and abetting … (1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture and cruel treatment;
(4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) violations of the rights to life, liberty,
91

Order Granting Mars Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 7, Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc.,
162 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) (No. 15-CV-04450) (“[W]hen the defendant
has not made any statements at all, a plaintiff cannot assert a claim under the FAL.”).

92

Id. at 8–11.

93

Chevron v. Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

94

Texaco/Chevron lawsuits (re Ecuador), BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, https://
www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador-1/.

95

See id.

96

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108, 108 (2013).

97

Id. at 113.

98

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).

99

Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 113–14 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018)).
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security, and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”100
The Supreme Court took up the issue of whether a claim brought under
the ATS may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.101 It affirmed the Second Circuit’s dismissal of the case because it concluded that “[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims
under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”102
In Doe v. Nestle,103 the third parties were “former child slaves who were
kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up
to fourteen hours a day without pay.”104 Defendants were large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, such as
Nestle, Cargill, and Archer Daniels.105 In their complaint, plaintiffs
raised claims for aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS. The district court had dismissed the case because it involved an impermissible
extraterritorial application of the ATS.106 However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed because the facts alleged claimed that the defendants provided
personal spending money to farms and cooperatives, which is “outside
the ordinary business contract and given with the purpose to maintain
ongoing relations with the farms so that defendants could continue
receiving cocoa at a price that would not be obtainable without
employing child slave labor.”107 Additionally, “[d]efendants also had
employees from their United States headquarters regularly inspect operations in the Ivory Coast and report back to the United States offices,
where these financing decisions, or ‘financing arrangements,’ originated.”108 The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the allegations paint a picture of overseas slave labor that defendants perpetuated from headquarters
in the United States.”109 However, following the Supreme Court’s

100

Id. at 114.
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Id.
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Id. at 108.
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Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018).
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clarification of corporate liability under ATS in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,110
the Ninth Circuit clarified that the ATS does not support claims against foreign corporations and that, on remand, plaintiffs would need to “specify
whether aiding and abetting conduct that took place in the United States is
attributable to the domestic corporations in the case.”111

II. ADVANTAGES OF A CORPORATE DUTY TO CONTRACT
FOR ADDRESSING SUPPLY CHAIN HARMS
This part introduces and discusses some of the advantages that a corporate
duty to contract offers for the current regulatory environment. The first
advantage is that it offers a means to address Type I externalities in addition
to bolstering efforts to reduce Type II externalities. The second advantage is
that it can incentivize corporations to invest in prevention by potentially triggering Caremark oversight obligations. The third advantage is that it can
incentivize corporations to take specific steps that they may not take under a
mandatory reporting regime. Finally, this duty may offer a judicial basis for
human rights due diligence when a legislative basis may seem unlikely.
A. Proposing a New Duty to Consider Third-Party Harms in Contract Design
Given the difficulties that third parties encounter in protecting themselves
through contract design and enforcement, what we need is a regard for
others at the bargaining table, especially when those others are not present to
advocate for their own interests. The contract contemplated may create significant externalities for third parties besides the contracting parties.112 These
externalities will manifest themselves following the conclusion of the contract
and during performance; in this way, these are ex post externalities. However,
the parties suffering from these externalities are not present during ex ante
contract design to address the risk of externalities through negotiating and
drafting contract clauses. And the contracting parties may have little incentive
110

Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1436 (U.S. 2018).

111

Nestle, 906 F.3d at 1127.
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See Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost, supra note 8, at 222–23 (“[F]or a variety of reasons,
many externalities are not dealt with by law, regulation or taxation …. Where the law fails
to require corporations to take their externalities into account, corporations rarely take
account of their social costs voluntarily.”).
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to consider those externalities. This tracks the familiar problem that negligence law often addresses: incentivizing parties to have some concern for the
welfare of others who may be injured by their own actions. Here, the action
is contracting, which can have significant consequences for the welfare of
others not at the bargaining table. We need to similarly incentivize contracting
parties to take these externalities into account.113 In order to do so, this article proposes the following basic idea for a new duty: Contracting parties must
take into account the interests of third parties when they could reasonably foresee that
performance of the contract would create a risk of physical harm to third parties. Reasonable contract provisions would satisfy the standard of care.
This duty to contract blends elements of both contract law and negligence law. It preserves the traditional arena for contracting (with all its
attendant benefits of flexibility, bargaining, and autonomy) but situates
the freedom to contract within the background of negligence law. Specifically, it borrows the duty element from negligence and uses it to circumscribe the freedom to contract and uses the concept of foreseeability
from negligence as a limiting principle for when this duty is triggered.
There is little question that economic activity in supply chains creates a risk of
physical harm to many individuals, especially laborers in those chains.114 The

113

Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost, supra note 8, at 223.

114

Rogers, supra note 39, at 46–47. In Rahaman, defendants focused on the omissions that illustrated
the breach of a duty rather than on the conduct that created the duty in the first place (terms of supply
contract). The Superior Court of Delaware accepted these allegations as involving nonfeasance in
which defendants are under no duty to act unless there is a special relationship between the parties,
or an exception applies. Rahaman v. J.C. Penny Corp., No. N15C-07-174, 2016 WL 2616375, at *7–
8 (Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016). However, one could also argue that by creating specific terms of
exchange, multinational buyers affirmatively act in the world and create risks of harm to others. This
is not nonfeasance but misfeasance. According to comment c to § 37 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, “[t]he proper question is not whether an actor’s specific failure to exercise reasonable care is an
error of commission or omission. Instead, it is whether the actor’s entire conduct created a risk of
physical harm.” As an illustration, the Restatement explains, “[A] failure to employ an automobile’s
brakes or a failure to warn about a latent danger in one’s product is not a case of nonfeasance
governed by the rules in this Chapter, because in these cases the entirety of the actor’s conduct (driving an automobile or selling a product) created a risk of harm. This is so even though the specific conduct alleged to be a breach of the duty of reasonable care was itself an omission.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 (2012); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 37 (2012) (“It would be necessary to ask hypothetically what
would have happened if the actor had not engaged in the conduct to determine whether a duty
exists.”). The Restatement’s explanation further clarifies that multinational buyers’ actions constitute
misfeasance warranting a duty of reasonable care. The terms of supply contracts that relate to volume, price, and delivery times create the risk of subcontracting and oversourcing, with all the attendant labor abuses. These are the predictable consequences of the supply contracts that multinational
buyers routinely write. As such, the course of the entire “conduct create[s] a risk of harm.”
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multiple lawsuits brought by laborers in these supply chains provide graphic
details of the abuse they have suffered from corporations and their suppliers.115
And these conditions are often a product of the terms of the supply contract
(Type I externality) or a failure of the supplier code of conduct (Type II externality). Therefore, under a negligence framework, the act of contract design creates a
risk of physical harm to these parties such that the contracting parties have a duty
to exercise reasonable care.116
Second, parties satisfy the duty with adequate contract design. All this
duty asks of the parties is that they consider whether contractual performance would create the risk of physical harm to parties not present at
the negotiating table. If so, this duty requires that contracting parties
control what they can control: contract design.
One disadvantage that third parties confront is that they are vulnerable to risk but powerless to address those risks because they are not at
the bargaining table when supply contracts are negotiated and designed.
There may be very little incentive for the parties at the bargaining
table—buyers and suppliers—to take their interests into consideration,
unless mandatory laws require the parties to do so or market pressure
creates incentives for consideration. This duty fills the gap by providing
incentives for contracting parties to consider externalities to others
besides themselves.
A contracting party satisfies the standard of care through contract
design that appropriately addresses the third-party externalities that the
contemplated contract creates. Here, the reasonable actor is not just any
ordinary actor but one who is charged with “any extra knowledge the
defendant” possesses. Contract design that satisfies this standard must
reflect the contracting parties’ knowledge of both foreseeable risks of
physical harms to third parties and the types of contractual provisions
that are necessary to address those risks.
Because this standard of care depends on knowledge, what constitutes “reasonable contract design” under this duty varies with time.
Imagine a hypothetical where Buyer and Supplier are aware of media
115
See, e.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at ¶¶
20–31, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., (No. 05-7307), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98102
(describing conditions inducing fatigue, situations of physical assault); Nestle, 906 F.3d at
1122 (“While being forced to work on the cocoa farms, plaintiffs witnessed the beating and
torture of other child slaves who attempted to escape.”).
116

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 77 (2005).
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coverage of forced labor conditions in the supply chains for the goods
they are planning to exchange. To combat this risk, they adopt a standard model clause promoted by an industry association of which they
are members. This clause provides for monitoring and inspection
rights of Buyer and establishes a “hotline” for grievances. However,
eight months later, Buyer learns of a number of instances of forced
labor in its supply chain involving Supplier. Buyer promptly terminates its
contract with Supplier. An internal audit by Buyer reveals that one reason the
forced labor occurred is because Buyer announced its visits to Supplier’s work
sites, thereby enabling the latter to hide the forced laborers and present Buyer
with a fake set of records.117 Another reason for the abuse is because the forced
laborers did not have access to the means to utilize the “hotline” that Buyer provided for in its code of conduct with Supplier. In its new supply contract with Supplier’s replacement, Supplier 2, Buyer cannot satisfy the standard of care by using
the exact same language it used in its previous contract with Supplier. It now
knows that announced visits will not work and that hotlines are ineffective. It must
therefore use its increased knowledge to design more effective clauses in its new
contract with Supplier 2.118 Whereas the initial contract clause could have satisfied
the standard of care with Supplier, the same clause does not satisfy the standard in
Buyer’s new contract with Supplier 2 because the latter knows more; therefore, it
must do more by incorporating that new knowledge in its contract design going
forward.
Finally, this duty to contract is limited by foreseeability: contracting
parties are not required to consider the interests of every third party
under the sun. Negligence law supplies the limiting principle to this
duty: contracting parties are under a duty to address externalities only
to third parties who they can reasonably foresee may experience physical
harm through performance of the parties’ contract. Given the guidance
of NGOs, government actors, and the past experiences of repeat actors
in supply chains, such as multinational corporations, contracting parties
can have some reasonable foundation for anticipating who may be
harmed by their activities. Indeed, under some national and international law guidelines, transnational corporations are already expected to
engage in human rights impact assessments when undertaking their

117

See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747,
774–79 (2014) (describing various strategies of audit evasion).

118
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business operations.119 This duty may also encourage buyer companies
to engage meaningfully in stakeholder engagement with those who may
be potentially harmed in order to draft clauses that are appropriate.
B. Targeting Type I Externalities
The first advantage of the proposed contractual duty is that it addresses Type
I externalities. This article argues that human rights abuses often arise not
only from the breach of contractual provisions (Type II externalities) but also
as foreseeable consequences of the contract as designed. That is why the
harms result from contract performance as much as from contract breach.
The proposed duty would require that contracting parties consider the effects
of the contract as envisioned on third parties and to alter the contract accordingly. It is this act of contract modification that allows contracting parties to
address Type I externalities. Otherwise, contracting parties will design their
contracts only to manage the risks they create, not to eliminate them.
While helpful, many contractual reforms of supply chain contracts focus
on addressing Type II externalities but may not do enough to address Type
I externalities. For example, the model clauses proposed by the Working
Group of the Business Law Section (WGBLS) of the American Bar Association offer contracting parties clauses ready to insert into their supply contracts and other agreements to reduce the risks of human rights abuses.120
But the addition of these contractual clauses may not necessarily cause contracting parties to rethink or redraft the other parts of the transaction that
give rise to the harms that the clauses are meant to address. At worst, it may
encourage a “tick the box” approach.121 The motivation to include these
provisions is to reduce legal risk or reputational risk. But these provisions
may not be adapted to the particularities of the company’s operations or the
119
See Special Representative of U.N. Secretary General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: A
Framework for Business and Human Rights, 14–21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). See
Working Grp. on Business and Human Rights, Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence: Emerging Practices, Challenges and Ways Forward, U.N. Doc. A/73/163 (October 2018); OECD,
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2011) http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/
48004323.pdf (introducing a new chapter on human rights); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA PRACTICAL GUIDE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 19–21
(2016); IPIECA, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE PROCESS 4 (2012).
120

See generally Snyder & Maslow, supra note 55.
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See generally David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance Regulation: The Prospect of
Achieving Corporate Accountability Through Transparency, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453 (2017).
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unique Type I externalities that these operations may create; as such, the
clauses do not speak to the unique risks of the transaction and are therefore
limited as a contractual tool. More critically, they provide less opportunity
for the company’s managers to reflect on the risks of the transaction.122 In
other words, what incentives do these contract clauses offer company managers to revisit the parts of the contract that do not specifically address Type
II externalities?
If company managers do not reflect, it is very unlikely that they will
change. As scholars have noted, “the resistance to a culture of compliance
is often via scripts, and so much of the compliance effort must be to
rewrite them.”123 Regulation should include opportunities for companies
to create new habituation practices that may counterbalance other powerful behavioral scripts within the company.124
Additionally, many model clauses still restrict duties on the part of
buyers.125 These restrictions mean that third parties cannot sue buyers
who fail to exercise the rights that these contract clauses give them. So
even though a referenced appendix of supplier obligations gives buyers
the right to inspect facilities, interview employees, review documents,
and perform other audit functions, buyers are under no contractual obligation to exercise those rights. And if buyers do not exercise those rights,
then suppliers face very little incentive to change their practices. They
may get the impression that these clauses, policies, and codes of conduct
are empty words that buyers do not intend to enforce and therefore will
maintain the status quo. It is understandable why the Working Group
decided to include these disclaimers regarding buyers’ duties. Otherwise,
buyers, fearful of legal liability, may hesitate to include such clauses in
their contracts—clauses that are nonmandatory and are included only if

See id. at 457 (describing the “paradox of compliance problem” in which “[f]irms adopt
compliance programs as insurance against prosecution; but because the effectiveness of a
program is difficult to determine, a firm can simply adopt the appearance of a program
and actually take less care to prevent wrongdoing. The end result is more wrongful
behavior.”).

122

123

Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 966 (2017).

124

Id. at 965 (“Compliance norms threaten the beliefs, behaviors and cultural tropes that
are instinctively success-producing.”).
125

Snyder & Maslow, supra note 55, at 1105 (describing Section 5.7 Disclaimer Clause).

2021 / Protecting Third Parties in Contracts

357

buyers and suppliers voluntarily decide to include them.126 The
prospect of legal liability may make it less likely that buyers would choose
to do so.

C. Incentivizing Prevention Under Caremark
A second advantage of the corporate duty to contract is that it may offer
an incentive for corporations to adopt supply chain compliance programs that prevent harms to third parties.127 One mechanism that can
encourage better compliance practices is directors’ oversight responsibility under In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation128 and,
more recently, Marchand v. Barnhill129 and In re Clovis Oncology.130 But
before there can be compliance, there must first be risk—often framed in
legal terms. The absence of a duty to third parties means that there is
minimal legal risk to corporations for their misconduct in the supply
chain; lack of duty leads to a lack of legal risk.131 Due to this lack of legal
risk, Caremark and its subsequent cases may not impose much of an

126
Snyder & Maslow, supra note 55, at 1096–97 (“The drafters have crafted the text this way
because some buyers may have the leverage to use the proposed text, and in any case, these
clauses are aimed primarily at companies in the role of buyer.”).
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See, e.g., David Millon, Human Rights and Delaware Corporate Law, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 173, 182–86 (2012) (discussing potential legal and reputational risk
associated with human rights violations abroad and the risk management responsibility of
the board of directors); Ramasastry, supra note 31, at 238 (explaining that business and
human rights “grows out of a quest for corporate accountability to mitigate or prevent the
adverse impacts of business activity on individuals and communities and out of expectations
grounded in a specific core set of human rights obligations”).
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In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996); Stone ex
rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006); Strine, supra note
29; see generally Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback,
90 TEMP. L. REV. 727, 731 (2018); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 719, 734 (2007).
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incentive to develop compliance programs that can serve a preventative
function in the supply chain.132
The unfortunate consequence is that third parties are wounded three
times over: first, through the initial misconduct; second, through a denial
of justice in the courts; and, third, by facing the prospect of recurrence of
the earlier misconduct due to inadequate compliance or other preventative corporate policies. The proposed duty addresses the Caremark problem by creating an incentive for those present at the bargaining table to
consider these third-party externalities when contracting. Much of the

132

See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 717, 719–20 (2009)
(explaining that under Stone v. Ritter, the “board is responsible only for preventing wrongful
or illegal acts. The board has no responsibility to prevent acts that are legal, but that lead to
harmful business results.”); Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good
Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 701 (2004) (“For directors,
increasingly concerned about personal financial liability, the goal became liability avoidance
rather than the prevention of corporate misconduct …. As the motivation for these actions
was primarily liability-driven, their actual impact on corporate activities was questionable. It
was the mere existence of these procedures that mattered-whether or not they would have
any actual impact on corporate compliance with law was of secondary concern.”); see also
James A. Fanto, The Governing Authority’s Responsibilities in Compliance and Risk Management, as
Seen in the American Law Institute’s Draft Principles of Compliance, Risk Management, and Enforcement, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 699, 705–06, 709 (2018) (discussing the prospect of legal liability to
the company as a driver of corporate compliance programs); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic
Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003) (discussing the ineffectiveness of “paper compliance programs”); Todd Haugh, Caremark’s
Behavioral Legacy, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 611, 634 (2018) (discussing behavioral incentives and
compliance initiatives). However, some have argued that Caremark’s penumbra may also
extend to ESG and reputational risks to the company and, therefore, is not limited only to
acts that may trigger legal liability. See Claire A. Hill, Caremark as Soft Law, 90 TEMP. L. REV.
681, 684–85 (2018) (“[W]hat directors and officers apparently think they should do to abide
by their Caremark duties is much more than what they have to do to avoid liability …. But
what boards do to abide by their Caremark duties extends to activities or omissions that are
not illegal.”); id. at 689 (“[A]t least part of the story is an obligation for the company to be
mindful of the harm it can do to third parties beyond anything that might be legally actionable.”); Millon, Human Rights and Delaware Corporate Law, supra note 127, at 185–86 (“[R]isk
management extends beyond avoidance of litigation to the broader challenge of avoiding
behavior that is likely to be condemned in the court of public opinion.”); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 978 (2009) (discussing the application of Caremark to failures in risk management). However, as discussed
later, the reputational damage to a corporation from misconduct in the supply chain may
depend on some predicate legal action that publicizes and disseminates the information.
Here, legal sanctions and reputational costs work together with the former influencing the
magnitude and effectiveness of the latter. See Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation,
67 DUKE L.J. 907, 913 (2018); Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal
System Shapes Behavior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1194, 1196 (2016).
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current legislation addressing supply chains—in the United States and
abroad—focuses on transparency measures and mandatory information
disclosures.133 These approaches do not impose fines or penalties on corporations for their performance. As such, there is no legal leverage to
get the compliance process going from a legal risk perspective.134
The challenges with curtailing supply chain externalities are familiar
ones associated with encouraging better compliance by corporate actors;
namely, how to encourage corporate actors to adopt a socially optimal
compliance program that “‘a rational, profit-maximizing firm would
establish if it faced an expected sanction equal to the social cost of the
violation.’”135 Scholars have noted the limitations of legal risk to incentivize corporations to adopt a socially optimal compliance program, including “limited regulatory resources, detection difficulties, legal
uncertainties and procedural obstacles, conflicts of interest, [and] political
pressure.”136
These problems are further compounded when it comes to human
rights compliance in supply chains because enforcement action is absent.
Most of the laws addressing supply chains rely on information disclosure
without recourse to legal fines or penalties. As a result, at present,
human rights abuses do not create many legal risks for companies. While
these abuses are unlawful, corporations are rarely held liable for these
acts because many of the legal rules prohibiting these acts are based in
international law that is addressed to state actors and not corporations.137 The low probability of corporate accountability for these acts
translates into low legal risk from a Caremark calculus. To avert a human
rights crisis, a corporation must, at minimum, have adequate
human rights compliance policies and practices in place. The incentive to

133
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do so, however, may rest upon the legal consequences to a corporation
from such a crisis. When there are minimal legal consequences, Caremark
may provide little incentive to adopt such a compliance program.
The duty to contract can help to address these shortcomings in a number of ways. First, it alters the Caremark calculus by recognizing duties
that may recalibrate the compliance calculation by offering the prospect
of legal accountability that is otherwise absent.138 This response not only
offers access to justice for those harmed by the corporate misconduct but
also gets the issues on the radar of corporate officers and directors so
that the misconduct may be averted in the future through adequate compliance efforts. After all, compliance is not a profit center within a corporation; there is competition for those dollars from those parts of those
organizations that are more profitable or from compliance areas that present more of a legal risk.139 Second, increased legal accountability may
shift the internal importance of these issues and transform them from
departments devoted to procurement or quality control into a matter for
the legal department.140

138
In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., Consol. C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188, at *12–13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (“Our Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Marchand v. Barnhill underscores the importance of the board’s oversight function when the
company is operating in the midst of "mission critical" regulatory compliance risk …. As
Marchand makes clear, when a company operates in an environment where externally
imposed regulations govern its ‘mission critical’ operations, the board’s oversight function
must be more rigorously exercised.”).
139
See Langevoort, supra note 128, at 730; Eugene Soltes, Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Corporate Compliance Programs: Establishing a Model for Prosecutors, Courts, and Firms, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 3, 965, 1005 (2018); ASSENT COMPLIANCE, BUDGETING FOR COMPLIANCE IN 2020
35 (2019) (“Between 2016 and 2019, companies reported increases of 16 to 25% in time
spent on labor; compliance professionals project that an increase of 11 to 15% more time
will be needed for compliance by 2022.”).
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IRENE PIETROPAOLI, LISE SMIT, JULIANNE HUGHES-JENNETT & PETER HOOD, A UK FAILURE TO
PREVENT MECHANISM FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS HARMS 17–18 (contrasting the comparing
the departments tasked with compliance with bribery as compared to human rights due diligence and arguing that “[i]f a regulation for human rights based on section 7 of the Bribery
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away from corporate social responsibility to the compliance and legal departments.”). But
see Mariam H. Baer, Compliance Elites, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599, 1624 (2020) (discussing the
drawbacks of “performance blind spots” of compliance officers).
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D. Addressing Weaknesses of Mandatory Reporting Requirements
Another advantage of the corporate duty to contract is that it may motivate companies to take steps that transparency laws fail to incentivize.
Many jurisdictions that have adopted supply chain laws relating to
human rights have adopted an information disclosure approach that
requires that companies tell the public about their human rights policies
and practices, for example, but does not require that they adopt one or
that it accord with a particular standard.
For example, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act141
requires covered corporations to disclose their efforts to ensure that their
supply chains are free from slavery and human trafficking, including
information about their practices concerning verification, audits, certifications, internal accountability standards and procedures, and training.142 The law requires that covered companies publish this information
on their website if they have one.143
Similarly, the UK Modern Slavery Act144 requires that covered companies provide an annual statement of the measures they take to eradicate
slavery from their supply chains.145 Specifically, Section 54 of the Act146
requires that the statement, “if the organisation is a body corporate other
than a limited liability partnership, must be approved by the board of
directors (or equivalent management body) and signed by a director
(or equivalent).”147 The company must also publish the statement on its
website in a prominent place if the company maintains a website.148
Section 54 also recommended a number of topics that a statement should
include, such as “its due diligence processes in relation to slavery and

141

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2012).

142
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Modern Slavery Act 2015 (U.K.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/
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LAW REVIEW 1017, 1038 (2018).
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human trafficking in its business and supply chains” and “the parts of
its business and supply chains where there is a risk of slavery and
human trafficking taking place, and the steps it has taken to assess and
manage that risk.”149 The problem is that many companies provided
insufficient information in many of these reporting categories because
Section 54 did not require that a company statement include this
information.150
Another problem is that mandatory reporting requirements don’t
seem to work well to improve corporate behavior.151 A significant number of companies are still not complying with the disclosure requirements in place—an outcome that is not surprising given the weak
sanctions available for noncompliance.152 And even if companies are
improving their reporting, they are not improving their underlying practices, which is the goal of the reporting regime. According to the Corporate Human Rights Benchmark (CHRB), nearly one-half of the
200 global companies assessed in 2019 scored zero across all indicators
related to human rights due diligence.153 The CHRB report also found
that many companies are not improving their practices over time, thus
“indicating that there have been insufficient incentives for them to
change.”154
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One explanation for this failure is that the UK and California laws
neglected to include a number of features that would enable reputational markets to work effectively. For example, the California supply
chain law did not provide a public list of the companies that were
covered by the law. This gap made it difficult for those—such as
NGOs—who wish to “name and shame” noncompliant companies
because there was no public list that identified which companies are
required to report. 155 Another criticism is the lack of a central repository for company statements provided under the reporting laws. 156
A central repository is important to facilitate comparisons between
companies so that stakeholders can identify “leaders and laggards”
and provide the appropriate market response.157 Finally, critics also
noted the lack of sanctions for noncompliance that undermines the
effectiveness of the reporting regime. 158 The Australian government
had the benefit of learning from experiences in these other jurisdictions and addressed many of these shortcomings when designing
their own supply chain law.159 For example, Australia’s Commonwealth Modern Slavery Act of 2018 160 mandates specific topics for
disclosure. 161
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These reforms certainly improve the design of reporting requirements.162 But reporting requirements may get us only so far. These
changes do not eliminate fundamental limitations of reputational
mechanisms that impede their ability to improve corporate behavior
in the supply chain. These mandatory disclosure laws seek to change
corporate behavior through reputational mechanisms. 163 The idea is
that the government actors mandate disclosure of information that
corporations would not otherwise share. Stakeholders, such as consumers, who now possess this information discriminate in the market
between corporations based on the information that is reported,
thereby providing financial penalties (or rewards) for superior or inferior corporate behavior.164
The issue is whether the audience for the information that is reported
under these laws—most prominently, consumers—cares enough to
impose market sanctions or rewards. Some research into reputational
markets suggests not. While there is no doubt that reputational sanctions
can levy significant financial costs for corporate misconduct,165
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companies engaging in environmental violations do not suffer similar
reputational losses.166 One explanation for this is the divergence
between interest and leverage: corporations suffer reputational losses
when their exchange partners, such as consumers or investors, alter
the terms of the exchange, often because of a fear of opportunism.
Under this explanation, the reputational sanction is wielded only by
these exchange partners. Environmental harms, however, “impose
costs on parties other than those with whom the polluting firm does
business.”167 Exchange partners are not directly affected by the firm’s
misconduct and are therefore less likely to sanction the firm.168 This
insight raises concerns not only about the efficacy of “naming and
shaming” relating to environmental misconduct but also about other
types of social impact, such as human rights abuses in the supply
chain. In these situations, those wielding the reputational sanctions—
often consumers—do not internalize the costs of wrongdoing; the
identities, and therefore interests, of the injured and the sanctioner
diverge, unlike in situations of financial misconduct in which reputational sanctions are high since the party who internalizes the cost of
wrongdoing is also the party who wields the sanction.
E. Increasing Prospects for Mandatory Due Diligence
Due to the disadvantages of mandatory reporting laws, a number of
countries are considering or implementing mandatory due diligence
laws that require that companies take specific due diligence steps;
reporting on what they do (and do not do) is not enough. While these
legislative steps are promising, we do not yet know how far these steps
may go to address Type I externalities. Additionally, and more fundamentally, it may be unlikely that general mandatory human rights due
diligence laws will be implemented in the United States. Specifically, it
may be difficult to mandate general and broad human rights due diligence in the United States through legislation. However, a corporate
duty to contract may provide a judicial basis for human rights due

166
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diligence,169 among additional steps that contracting parties may take.
Much of the basis for legislative action on human rights due diligence
traces back to the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business &
Human Rights, which states that businesses have a “responsibility to
respect human rights,”170 and, as part of that responsibility, businesses
should have in place a “human rights due diligence process to identify,
prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on
human rights.”171 A company’s responsibility for due diligence includes
evaluating (a) “the country contexts in which their business activities take
place, to highlight any specific human rights challenges they may pose
[,]” (b) the “human rights impacts their own activities may have within
that context—for example, in their capacity as producers, service providers, employers, and neighbours[,]” and (c) “whether they might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their activities,
such as with business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other nonState actors.”172 Appropriate due diligence requires formulating a firmspecific human rights policy, impact assessments, integration of the
human rights policy throughout the firm, and tracking performance
through monitoring and auditing.173 These UN guidelines have, in turn,

169
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influenced best practices and manuals produced by the OECD,174 the
International Bar Association,175 and the American Bar Association,176
among other organizations.
The French Corporate Duty of Vigilance177 provides an example of
this approach and establishes “a legally binding obligation for parent
companies to identify and prevent adverse human rights and environmental impacts resulting from their own activities, from activities of companies they control, and from activities of their subcontractors and
suppliers, with whom they have an established commercial relationship.”178 Soon, France may not be alone. Similar mandatory due diligence laws have been proposed or considered in at least thirteen other
countries, and the European Commission is also considering an EU-wide
equivalent.179 In 2019, the Netherlands Child Labor Due Diligence
Act180 introduced “a duty of care for companies to prevent the supply of
goods or services which have come into existence using child labor, to
Dutch end-users.”181 According to legal commentary, “[t]he Act imposes
three main obligations on companies: (i) a duty to investigate by means
of due diligence whether there is a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that goods or
services to be supplied have been created using child labor; (ii) a duty to
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develop and execute a plan of action in case there is a reasonable suspicion of child labor; and (iii) a duty to issue a statement to the supervising
authority that it observes the aforementioned due diligence requirements.”182 The Act also authorizes fines in the event of noncompliance
and, “[w]hile the Act’s criminal provision is ambiguous, it appears that
individual directors of a company may face up to two years of imprisonment or a criminal fine of up to EUR 21,750.” 183
A second issue is whether we can expect comparable mandatory due diligence legislation at the state or federal level in the United States. The current human rights due diligence laws seem circumscribed in their
application to specific types of actors or specific types of goods from specific locations. For example, the Federal Acquisition Regulations includes
specific requirements regarding compliance programs addressing human
trafficking.184 Additionally, the 2012 US Conflict Minerals Rule requires
that “[i]f tin, tantalum, tungsten or gold is necessary to the functionality or
production of a product manufactured or contracted to be manufactured
by a U.S. public company registrant, it must conduct a ‘reasonable country
of origin inquiry’ to determine whether the necessary 3TG minerals in the
product originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country.”185 In situations where “the minerals originated outside of
the DRC region or are from recycled or scrap sources, the registrant is
required to disclose on Form SD its determination and describe its reasonable country of origin inquiry and the related results.”186 “If the registrant
knows or has reason to believe that necessary 3TG minerals are from the
DRC region, it must conduct enhanced due diligence and file a separate
Conflict Minerals Report exhibit to its Form SD, detailing the measures
taken to exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of the
minerals and information concerning the processing facilities, the country
of origin and the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin.”187
182
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184
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III. BEYOND SUPPLY CHAINS: THE NORMATIVE BASIS
FOR PROTECTING THIRD PARTIES
What does the plight of third parties in supply contracts tell us about the
status of third parties in contracts generally? After all, the risks of Type I
and Type II externalities—and the limits of managing them—are
encountered by a variety of third parties under a variety of contracts. A
multitude of contracts have the prospect of harming us even if we have
no say in the underlying bargain. Supply chain contracts are illustrative
of the vulnerabilities third parties experience but do not exhaust the scenarios in which these externalities may arise. Instead, they illustrate
broader challenges experienced by third parties in contract, such as the
unfortunate reality that rights do not track harms: the fact of harm does
not furnish third parties with legal rights at the bargaining table or in the
courtroom.
The proposed contract duty can similarly encourage contracting
parties to revisit contract design and reduce the risks of these harms to
third parties. But the extension of this duty beyond the supply chain
requires a normative examination of why third-party interests should
matter—within the supply chain and beyond. Part II explored the practical policy reasons for a duty to contract; this part examines the normative basis for that duty.
Specifically, Part III.A illustrates how the “outsider” status of third
parties is inappropriate given the multiple benefits they bring to
exchanges, such as by reducing search and information costs, improving
information flows, and magnifying and redistributing losses. Part III.B
discusses the normative implications that result from recognizing a contract as an ecosystem and identifies three contracting principles that
contracting parties should honor: (a) third-party protections from negative externalities, (b) contract design obligations of contracting parties,
and (c) recourse to legal remedies for third parties.
A. Contracts as Ecosystems: Recognizing the Roles of Third Parties in Exchanges
What follows is an illustrative but not exhaustive discussion of the many
institutions that third parties create and the functions these institutions
provide. Institutions constrain human behavior and interactions, and
such constraints broadly “include any form of constraint that human
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beings devise to shape human interaction.”188 Institutions can consist of
formal rules, such as laws, as well as informal ones, such as codes of conduct.189 The purpose of an institution is to provide guidance on how to
behave when we interact with other people.190
Institutions are often confused with a related but distinct concept: organizations. If institutions are the rules, then organizations are the players
or “groups of individuals bound together by some common objective
[ ].”191 The combination of institutions and organizations around us
structures the choices we make daily, encouraging us toward some forms
of behavior while deterring us from others.192 For the purpose of this
part, a “third-party institution” refers to “rules of the game” established,
maintained, and enforced by parties other than the participants in an
exchange relationship; in the familiar contracts setting, third parties are
nonsignatories to the contracts. A “third-party organization” is a grouping of individuals who are not participants in the exchange.
The dividing line between exchange participants or contract signatories, on the one hand, and third parties, on the other, is not clear or
fixed. After all, exchange participants are also members of our society, so
they help to maintain the “third-party institutions.” The point is that
while exchange participants may contribute to the operation of these
institutions, they cannot maintain these institutions alone; instead, they
need the assistance of parties not a part of their exchange to maintain
these institutions. As discussed in Table 2, these institutional functions
discussed below are some of the major contributions that third parties
provide to contracting ones, which generally fall into two categories: lowering transaction costs ex ante, and (or because of) lowering risk of opportunism ex post.193
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1. Lowering Transaction Costs Ex Ante
Consider the risks associated with contractual uncertainty when two
parties are strangers to each other. To proceed with the exchange, a
party will likely engage in at least two types of costly activities to protect
itself against the risk of breach or other misconduct by the other: information gathering regarding the other’s propensity for opportunism,194 and
negotiating and drafting a more complicated contract sufficiently detailed
to identify noncompliance and provide remedies and other protections.195 Third-party institutions assist both of these functions by lowering ex ante information costs through organizations, networks, and norms
that improve both the production and accuracy of information regarding
potential exchange partners. Third-party institutions also provide background rules against which parties contract.
The first set of benefits that third-party institutions provide is to reduce the
information costs of screening potential exchange partners, including evaluating potential partners for the likelihood of noncompliance. Forming an opinion on that likelihood requires information, and this information-gathering
comes at a cost. In some situations, the cost may be too high relative to the
expected value of the exchange, resulting in a party forgoing exchanging
with an unknown party (loss of trade relationship) or, perhaps, forgoing the
exchange entirely (loss of trade). In other situations, the party may go ahead
with the exchange but only after investing in costly information gathering
that will cut into that party’s gains from exchange. Finally, the party can
address the risks posed by the unknown counterparty through contract
design with provisions addressing opportunism; however, this will also lead
to additional costs with complicated contract design ex ante.
Kinship networks help to reduce these costs by providing low-cost
credible information regarding risk of opportunism by different parties
at varying levels of social distance.196 These predictions are based on
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(“[P]otential traders must search each other out, and, once such interested parties have
made contact, they must try to find out more about each other. Specifically, each has to
determine who the other party is and whether he is willing and able to live up to any agreement that may be reached.”).
195

Id.

196

Landa, supra note 5, at 359–60.

372

Vol. 58 / American Business Law Journal

Table 2: Advantages of Third-Party Institutions for Contracting Parties
Third-Party
Actors

Third-Party
Institutions

Institutional Functions

Kinship
groups

Kinship
institutions

Trade
associations

Merchant law

Ethical
communities

Social preferences

Communities

Club goods

Communities

Inter-generational
reputational
capital
Coordinated
punishment

• Expands time
horizon for
reputational capital
• Magnifies losses of
opportunism
through collective
sanctions

Private dispute
resolution
Information
networks

• Generates accurate
reputation-relevant
information
• Transmits
information across
great distances with
limited number of
nodes

Communities
Trade
associations

Trade
associations

• Provides credible
information
regarding the
likelihood of
opportunism by
potential exchange
partners
• Provides background
sets of norms and
expectations with
which to identify
parties who cheat
• Preferences for
trustworthiness,
reciprocity, fairness,
and prohibitions on
falsehoods regarding
others
• Bonds social
relationships to
business conduct

Contractual Advantage
• Lowers ex ante
information costs
with selecting
exchange partners

• Reduces negotiation
costs by supporting
incomplete contracts

• Reduces risk of
opportunism
• Lowers information
costs by improving
accuracy of
information
• Increases losses from
opportunism (adds
social losses to
economic losses)
• Redistributes losses
from opportunism
• Redistributes losses
from opportunism
• Increases losses from
opportunism by
aggregating
exchanges with
collective
• Supplies credible
and public
information that
facilitates
reputational
mechanisms and
collective
punishment
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shared norms and values, such as a code of ethics, that govern those
traders. For example, in a study of ethnically homogeneous middlemen,
the standard of conduct was provided by the Confucian code of ethics.197
This code allowed traders to form reliable expectations about the risks of
exchanging with different types of partners at varying levels of social distance
from themselves: near and distant kin, clan, village, ethnicity, and nationality.198
These expectations are provided by the shared code of ethics that established
guidance regarding how one trader would treat another based on social distance.199 Kinship institutions thereby facilitate exchange in situations in which
they might not otherwise occur because of the high level of contract uncertainty,
on the one hand, and an ineffective legal framework, on the other.200 Associational membership also serves as a screening device that parties may use when
searching for another party with whom they may want to exchange.201
Third parties develop certain types of social preferences that can help
reduce information costs by decreasing the likelihood that individuals
will crowd the marketplace for information with misinformation.202
Third parties also develop social preferences for trustworthiness,203
fairness,204 and reciprocity that are advantageous to the activity of
exchanging.205 For example, the preference for trustworthiness reduces
the risk that a party sharing that preference will engage in opportunism
because they will experience some level of loss by engaging in that
action. Similarly, parties often value reciprocity independent of outcomes
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because of the qualities that reciprocity reveals about the character of the
exchange parties; these perceived qualities can then help one exchange
partner predict how the other will treat them in the future.206
Next, third parties developed institutions that allowed contracting
parties to utilize incomplete contracts and thereby economize on contract drafting costs ex ante. The merchant law developed by trade associations can help to reduce the burden to create detailed contracts
between parties.207 In a historical example, the Maghrebi traders of
the eleventh century faced high negotiation costs given the poor state
of technology and vast distances of trade.208 The use of the merchant
law reduced these costs because it provided a significant baseline of
norms and expectations upon which the parties exchanged, reducing
the need to rely on detailed contracts.209 Not only did this law facilitate the use of incomplete contracts; it also provided the traders with a
means of identifying cheaters despite the use of incomplete contracts.210 Without the aid of the merchant law, it would have proven
difficult to differentiate between cheaters and honest traders because
incomplete contracts did not specify sufficient details to ascertain
breach.211
2. Lowering Risk of Opportunism Ex Post
Third-party institutions discourage parties from engaging opportunistically ex post by improving information flows between individuals; therefore, potential cheaters know that future exchange partners will learn
about their conduct. When such information is accompanied by coordinated punishment, potential defectors will likely resist the temptation to
act opportunistically because of the prospect of losing future exchanges
with other parties. Through such coordinated punishment, third-party
organizations magnify the potential losses from noncompliance. They
also magnify the potential losses by binding business relationships with
206
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social position, so that misconduct in one sphere of a merchant’s life has
consequences for another. Finally, third-party institutions redistribute
losses from the potential cheater to those in their social circles, thereby
providing additional inducements for cooperation.
First, third-party institutions deter opportunism by magnifying losses
from noncompliance. For example, problems can arise when the temptation of short-term gains from cheating exceed the value of profits from
future exchanges with a particular exchange partner. In some situations,
that exchange partner may be unable to surmount the gains from
cheating by themselves. However, third parties acting collectively can
increase the losses associated with cheating through coordinated punishment, binding social and business lives, and redistributing losses.
Coordinated punishment occurs when third parties respond collectively to acts of cheating against one of their members. In a simple example, consider an exchange between parties X and Y in a situation where
X’s short-term gains from cheating are greater than the present value of
long-term gains from exchanging with Y in the future. Even though the
prospect of losing Y’s future business may not be enough to deter X
from cheating in the present, the cost-benefit analysis changes when the
other members of the trade coalition or association also threaten to
refrain from exchanging with X if X cheats Y. By threatening
to ostracize X, the other trade members add the value of future
exchanges with them to the cost-benefit analysis, thereby magnifying the
losses associated with cheating and outweighing the short-term gains
from cheating.212
In order for coordinated punishment to deter opportunism, those
engaging in the punishment must have access to information regarding
the conduct of the cheater. This depends on three separate information
functions: production, verification, and transmission. Third parties provide
institutions that serve each of these functions.
For example, private dispute resolution mechanisms may be very
effective at generating information needed for punishment to occur. Critically, these mechanisms may provide sanctions but do not need to do so
in order to prove effective; instead, sanctions are often provided by community or trade members who respond to the information that the
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private dispute panel reveals.213 For example, in the diamond industry, the
New York Diamond Dealers Club’s (DDC) private arbitration system “is
wholly incapable of enforcing agreements on its own and is toothless in
punishing diamond theft.”214 Instead, “the DDC’s role is purely informational, and the power of its dispute resolution system rests on the degree to
which it supports trust-based exchange and can foreclose future transactions to uncooperative merchants. The DDC fulfills this role by facilitating
information exchange and publicizing individual reputations.”215
Private dispute resolution is valuable not only for information production
but also for verification. Information revealed through dispute mechanisms
tends to be viewed as more accurate, thereby reducing the need for independent verification processes and additional information gathering.216
Information production is only part of the challenge; once the information is gathered, how is it transmitted across the distances in which
exchanges may occur? Here, third-party institutions also operate to facilitate exchanges by creating information networks. Specifically, connections
between communities and trade groups in different areas can aid in the
transmission of reputation-relevant information.217 Finally, the prospect
for magnification and redistribution of losses depends on information
flows. Private dispute resolution mechanisms can both generate and publicize information regarding a merchant’s misconduct. These institutions
do not need to supply the sanctions; instead, they trigger them by invoking certain responses from the broader community or trade organizations.218 Even informal institutions play an important role through
213
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information networks like clubs or interpersonal ties that can transmit
information across distances both modest and great.
These information networks deter opportunism by making the threat
of sanctions credible. Otherwise, a potential cheater engaging in opportunism that is difficult to detect, verify, or publicize may think: “Yes, but
you have to learn of it first to punish me.” Without information, there is
no punishment; and without punishment, there is a higher risk of
cheating. Information networks counteract the temptation to cheat by
allowing parties to know that their acts of opportunism will be detected
and broadcast to all of their potential future trading partners. Thereby,
by cheating, a party risks their relationship not only with the merchant
they are cheating but with all the other merchants as well.
By deterring opportunism through third-party institutions, such as
coordinated punishment and information networks, communities and
trade associations reduce the risks that a non-cheating party may
encounter in an exchange and, consequently, reduce the costs that the
party may need to incur in order to protect against the risk of
opportunism.
Community club goods also magnify the losses associated with
noncompliance.219 Communities may confer status upon individuals that
the latter would not jeopardize through noncompliance. For example, in
New York’s diamond industry, actors who would normally pose a significant threat to exchange because of the significant short-term gains of
opportunism (high value of diamonds), high level of informalities in
exchange, and limited future returns from future exchanges given their
low wages do not flee with the diamonds because of the value of excludable community goods that would be denied to them following opportunism.220 Membership may also provide a sense of belonging and
identity to an association’s participants such that they would not risk
breaching the association’s relevant institutions—religious norms, Confucian ethics, merchant law—if such behavior would result in ostracism or
expulsion. Through these various means, community institutions
219
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increase the losses resulting from noncompliance and thereby deter
opportunism; the interdependence between social and business institutions increased the risk that conduct within one arena may reverberate
in the other.
The bonding of social and business relationships also leads to the creation of inter-generational reputational capital, which deters opportunism
by redistributing losses from noncompliance. If reputational capital
belonged only to the individual merchant (with no transferability prospects), then that reputational capital would incentivize only the merchant’s good behavior for the duration of the merchant’s career. This
creates the risk that merchants may engage in opportunism near the end
of their careers when they do not anticipate future exchanges.221 However, the time horizon for the value of reputational capital is extended
through transferability of that capital to the merchant’s familial or social
circles, thereby redistributing the potential gains and losses from opportunism to the merchant’s family members.222
B. Contracting Principles under an Ecosystem Approach
The analysis of exchanges above reveals that third parties are not outsiders in contracts but very much insiders who provide integral institutional functions to contracting parties. This “insider” status carries with it
normative significance concerning how third parties should be treated.
This section explains three normative implications that result from a
vision of a contract as an ecosystem:
(a) Principle 1: If third parties are insiders within a contract ecosystem,
they should be protected from the types of harms that other contract
insiders—contracting parties—choose to address.
(b) Principle 2: If third parties are insiders within contract ecosystems
who should be protected from harm, then we must incentivize
those who are agents of those harms—contracting parties—to
avoid those actions through contract design by asking: What would
the contracting parties have bargained for in the contract if they
were the ones who confronted the risks of harm?
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(c) Principle 3: If third parties are part of the contract ecosystem who are
entitled to contract protections outlined in (b), then we must provide
legal sanctions for those contracting parties who fail to do so.
The following three subsections expand on these three principles to
explain how each results from a vision of contracts as ecosystems.
1. Principle 1: Protection from Harm
The first implication is that third parties should be protected from negative externalities generated by the contract that the contracting parties
themselves would have addressed had they been the ones at risk. This
implication results from the moral equality of all contract insiders that
defies placing the interests of some over those of others. The ecosystem
view reveals that both contracting parties and third parties coexist within
contracts, but we generally pay attention to the rights and interests of the
former. We preserve this view even while it becomes increasingly difficult
to ignore the harms that this latter category of actors confront from contracting relationships.
If both groups of actors are present within contract ecosystems, it is
difficult to justify a situation in which one group (contracting parties)
is empowered to protect itself from the harms of contract activities while
the other (third parties) is not. What normative lens justifies this differentiation that results in us prioritizing the vulnerabilities of some but not
others? Certainly, the latter have the ability to address these risks while
the former do not (as yet); however, this is an observation of current realities and does not reflect a normative evaluation of their status within
contract ecosystems. The fact that third parties cannot protect themselves
from harm does not mean that they should not be able to do so. This gap
illustrates only the limitations of the law.223 For this observation to serve
as a guide on the moral equality of the parties or the priorities of their
harms is to doubly wound those marginalized in contracts: First, the law
ignores their plight, and second, our imagination constricts to reflect
those same limitations. Encouraging this view creates the danger that
those legal limitations may be viewed as parameters for possibilities. For
those reasons, our views on the rights of third parties should
223
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acknowledge the roles they perform in contracts and not simply focus on
the realities that the law currently reflects.
If we cannot justify the prioritization of one set of vulnerabilities over
the other, then we must ask: From what risks should third parties be
protected? One way of reformulating the question is to ask it this way:
What negative externalities would third parties address had they the
opportunity to do so? Here, we may be guided by the choices that contracting parties make because their choices reflect both (a) the vulnerabilities to externalities that contracts create, as well as (b) contracting
choices that address those externalities. At a minimum, contracting
parties protect themselves against the risk of harm from other contracting parties in the exchange—namely, counterparties. Often, this risk of
harm is opportunism that can affect their economic interests and the
benefits they expect to receive in the exchange. We may also expect contracting parties to protect themselves against physical risks should they
be vulnerable to physical harms. We can therefore use this analysis to
predict the categories of externalities that contract ecosystems create and
that are priorities for attention.
One potential objection to equating the normative status between contracting parties and third parties in contract ecosystems is the observation that the third parties who maintain the institutions necessary for
exchange (donor third parties) are not necessarily the same as those who
suffer harms within contract ecosystems and whose interests this article
advances (beneficiary third parties). Donor third parties are the types of
individuals and organizations discussed in Part III.A. These are the trade
associations and their members who relay information from one end of a
trading route to another. They are the community organizations that
ostracize or expel members who have violated business norms. They are
the kinship groups who develop and maintain ethical norms that instill
social preferences for fairness, reciprocity, truth, and trust in their members. And they are the individuals who create social organizations and
practices that have value in our society—social goods that are contingent
on good standing within one’s community and therefore serve to bond a
trader’s professional and personal lives.
But these are not necessarily the third parties who are at risk from the
externalities discussed in Part I. These third parties are the laborers at
supply factories who are harmed when buyers do not enforce their supplier codes of conduct. They are consumers who allege harms when they
unintentionally contribute to the perpetuation of human rights abuses
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through their purchases. And they are the communities who are at risk
of environmental, economic, and physical risk because of the nature of
corporate activities in their region.
One way to reconcile this incongruence is by identifying the areas of
potential overlap between these two groups. It is true that some of the
beneficiary third parties are also donor third parties who maintain institutions integral to the successful operation of supply contracts. For example, consumers are important actors in maintaining the demand for
certain goods and services (market institutions). They and other actors in
society also determine the reputation of companies, thereby influencing
their brand value. In these ways, beneficiary third parties contribute to
the maintenance of institutions that are important to the operation of
supply contracts.
Conversely, donor third parties may suffer externalities from
exchanges. For example, communities may create club goods that are
available only to their members and, consequently, serve as an incentive
for contractual cooperation.224 Club goods not only induce a trader to
keep their promise but also create a community interest in the trader
doing so: “The credibility of its members certainly brings wealth to the
community, ensuring sustained income for its current workers and its
younger members, but it also reflects an adherence to values that have
religious significance to the community and, according to the club good
model, add to each members’ utility.”225 As such, certain externalities
may destroy the institutions that donor third parties build, thereby causing harms to the latter.
The extent of overlap is an empirical question; more importantly, to
focus on the overlap is to miss the point. This article does not argue that
this individual should receive contractual protection under this contract
because the individual supplied these beneficial institutional functions. It
is not a market exchange model of rights in which a person is entitled to
contractual protection only because that person provided something of
value to the exchanging parties. Instead, the ecosystem view is only
meant to challenge the perception that exchanges occur between two
parties. Its frame illustrates that some subset of third parties play an
important role, even if the beneficiary third parties are not among them.
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Finally, at a high enough level of abstraction, all beneficiary third
parties are donor third parties. The third-party institutions discussed in
Part III are generally private and do not involve state action. But a wide
variety of public institutions also create the conditions for exchanges to
flourish, such as laws and courts, which are also products of the thirdparty institution of the state.
2. Principle 2: Protection from Externalities—Ex Ante Contract Design
It is one thing to identify externalities for attention. It is another challenge to identify methods by which to address these externalities. The
unique but unfortunate position of third parties is that they experience
the harms from contracting relationships but are often powerless to
address those externalities. If third parties are part of contract ecosystems who should be protected from harms, then the next task is to incentivize those who are the agents of that harm to avoid those actions.
One approach is through contract design. Here, we might ask: What
would the contracting parties have bargained for in the contract if they
had been the ones vulnerable to these externalities? First, contracting
parties may modify contractual obligations to minimize the risk of externalities posed by the contract. For example, corporations may modify
production schedules and volume expectations to minimize the risk of
labor violations in the supply chain. Second, contracting parties may
introduce new contract obligations to address the potential externalities
that could result from contract performance. Supplier codes of conduct
are one such contract mechanism, but given the externalities that remain
unaddressed, contracting parties may upgrade these contract provisions
with enhanced obligations.
Third, contracting parties may realize that some contract requirements
create the risk of externalities that may be too difficult to address
through contract provisions and, as a consequence, eliminate those obligations wholly from the contract. By placing the contracting party in the
position of the third party, we may expect the elimination of problematic
provisions that would not have been within contract ecosystems if third
parties had a voice at the bargaining table. Fourth, it is also possible that
the entire contract may be immune to redemption. Here, the thought
exercise does not eliminate specific contract provisions but forecloses the
possibility of the contract as a whole because the contract is one that creates externalities to third parties grave enough that contracting parties
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should ask: Is this a contract that should be performed? This is an
important question because not every imagined contract is a socially
desirable one. Some contracts may create the risk of harms that are so
grave that if third parties had a voice, they would prohibit the contract.
Or, if contracting parties suffered the risk of harm, they would never
sanction its performance.
All these thought exercises unite the risks faced by third parties with
the power enjoyed by contracting parties by asking how the latter would
act if they confronted the same risks as the former. However, imagination
can get us only so far. Contracting parties can only imagine what third
parties may prefer. This may lead to inaccurate beliefs and suboptimal
contracting choices. Therefore, the last response from this thought exercise is consultation: contracting parties may be better off if they stopped
imagining what third parties would want and instead asked them directly
through consultations or a role in the bargaining process. These are all
natural consequences from the thought exercise described above. They
may not be plausible consequences; however, this section is intended to
explore how externalities in the supply chain may be addressed.
3. Principle 3: Protection from Externalities—Ex Post Legal Remedies
The other means of addressing contract externalities is through legal
remedies. If third parties are part of contract ecosystems who should be
protected from externalities, then they are owed the obligations outlined
in Part III.B, and the law should provide sanctions for those contracting
parties who fail to perform those contract design obligations. Specifically,
the contract ecosystem view reveals that third parties should be entitled
to consideration at the contract design stage in order to minimize the
externalities they may face; contracting parties should take the interests
of third parties into account by asking what the contracting parties would
have bargained for had they been the ones facing those same risks. But
contracting parties may fail to do so, and the law should provide sanctions for this failure.
Legal sanctions provide two important benefits: access to remedies and
incentives for compliance. The first benefit is access to remedies. If contracting parties and third parties both sustain contract ecosystems, then it
does not make sense to offer only one set of these actors remedies for
harms that flow from these ecosystems. Imagine that we did not offer
contracting parties legal remedies for the harms they may encounter as
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result of a contract, either its breach or performance. That outcome
would be both impractical and unfair. It is impractical because many
parties would not enter into contracts if they could not access legal remedies for harms they suffered as a result of the contract relationship. It is
also impractical because the prospect of legal sanction for breach may
influence the parties’ conduct under the contract and reduce the likelihood of those harms arising. It is also unfair because we expect the law
to provide a remedy when a party has suffered a harm to its legally
protected interests.
The impracticality and unfairness are magnified when it comes to
third parties. While third parties do not “enter” contracts the way contracting parties do, the prospect of legal remedies ex post also influences
the behavior of contracting parties and determines the likelihood of
harms that third parties may encounter under the contract. It is also
unfair because the harms that third parties confront are ones that the
law recognizes as injuries that deserve a remedy, such as those discussed
in Part I.C. If we protect contracting parties against risks from contracts
that threaten their nonphysical well-being, it is even more apparent that
we should protect third parties from contract threats that endanger their
physical security.
This leads to the second justification for ex post legal remedies: incentives for compliance. Ideally, the law would incentivize prevention of
harms to third parties, but contracting parties may not invest in preventative compliance measures without the prospect of a legal sanction for a
failure to do so. Therefore, by providing legal remedies ex post, the law
also achieves the added advantage of potentially decreasing the risks of
similar harms in the future.
One potential objection is that we provide legal remedies to contracting parties and not to third parties because the former consented to the
contract exchange, whereas the latter did not. The former exercised a
choice upon the expectation of legal options should the contract not
unfold as expected; or, more bluntly, contracting parties choose to place
themselves in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis their counterparties because
of their expectation that the background of legal rights can help to mitigate their vulnerability.
In contrast, third parties made no choice to enter the contract; they
took no action based on the expectation that the law would mitigate the
harms they may face under the contract. They did not undertake any
particular action (or forbearance) upon the expectation of exercising
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legal rights that are generally available to contracting parties. The institutional functions they perform are ones that they would otherwise perform anyway, independent of any protection that the law offers to
mitigate their vulnerability to contractual harm. Unlike contracting
parties, they did not choose to place themselves in a vulnerable position
under the contract.
The lack of consent to contract does not reduce the claim to protection
of third parties; instead, it augments it. It is true that most third parties
who suffer harms from contract exchanges do not consent to these contracts. That is what makes their situation particularly perilous and sympathetic. They take on the risk of harm even when they (a) do not
benefit from the fruits of the exchange, which flow to the contracting
parties, and (b) did not consent to those risks. If both contracting parties
and third parties have normative equality within contract ecosystems,
then it is unfair that the former have the privilege of consenting to risks
within this ecosystem whereas the latter do not. It is even more unfair
when we punish third parties for failing to exercise choice in the risks
they face; to do so is to expose them to unconsented risk and then blame
them for their absent consent.

CONCLUSION
This article explores the issue of third-party externalities in the global
supply chains in which many of our familiar products are created and
valued services rendered. The men, women, and children who work in
these supply chains—or are otherwise affected by them—have very little
voice in designing the contracts that these supply chains support. However, it is often they who suffer from physical harm that results from the
performance of these contracts or breaches of the codes that are meant
to address these risks.
This problem highlights the vulnerable position of third parties in contracts. On the one hand, third parties provide a variety of important
institutional functions that allow exchanges to occur. Specifically, the private ordering arrangements established by kinship groups, communities,
and trade associations, among others, reduce transaction costs associated
with search, bargaining, negotiating, drafting, and enforcing contracts.
Despite these benefits, third parties have a limited role in addressing
these externalities because they do not have a seat at the bargaining table
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and so cannot participate in contract design ex ante, and they are without
a cause of action with which to address these harms ex post through legal
enforcement.
This article seeks to fill this gap by proposing a duty that blends the
most desirable dimensions of contract and tort law. It preserves the traditional arena for party autonomy and flexibility with a standard of care
that is satisfied by appropriate contract design. However, it also borrows
negligence law’s incentives for exercising care toward others. In combination, this duty offers a way to incentivize contracting parties to address
both Type I and Type II externalities that they may impose on third
parties through contracting decisions in supply chains.

